Facilitating Meaningful Change Within U.S. Law Schools by Gaughan, Patrick H.
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
Volume 16 | Number 2 Article 28
3-20-2018
Facilitating Meaningful Change Within U.S. Law
Schools
Patrick H. Gaughan
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The University of New Hampshire Law Review by an authorized editor of University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Repository Citation
Patrick H. Gaughan, Facilitating Meaningful Change Within U.S. Law Schools, 16 U.N.H. L. Rev. 243 (2018)
 243 
Facilitating Meaningful Change Within U.S. Law Schools 
  




Despite the widely recognized challenges and complaints facing U.S. 
legal education, very little is understood about how law schools can adapt 
faster and better.  This Article uses institutional theory, behavioral 
economics, and psychology to explain why change has proven so difficult for 
U.S. law schools.  Next, using institutional entrepreneurship, the Article 
explains the theoretical steps necessary to overcome the institutional 
resistance to change.  The Article then discusses the characteristics of 
opportunities that are most likely to better meet the needs of law students 
while also providing sustainable benefits to the individually innovating law 
schools.  Using management theory, the Article then proposes a seven-step 
change process model to enable individual law schools to systematically 
overcome institutional resistance, formulate unique strategies, and actually 




I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................244 
II. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL RESISTANCE TO 
CHANGE .......................................................................................................248 
A. Behavioral Economics and Psychology. ..........................................249 
B. Institutional Theory and Institutionalization ...................................252 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL SHOCKS, CARRYING CAPACITY, AND INDIVIDUAL 
LAW SCHOOL PERSPECTIVES .......................................................................258 
IV. ACHIEVING DISTINCTIVE AND MEANINGFUL CHANGE .......................261 
A. Enabling Change Through Institutional Entrepreneurs ..................261 
B. The Characteristics of Meaningful Opportunities—VRIO. ..............266 
1. Valuable .......................................................................................270 
2. Rare ..............................................................................................271 
3. Inimitable .....................................................................................273 
                                                          
*  Patrick H. Gaughan is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of 
Akron.  He earned his B.A. from Columbia University; M.B.A. from Trinity College, 
Dublin; J.D. from the University of Virginia; and his D.B.A. (International Business) 
from Cleveland State University.  The author would like to thank Martin H. Belsky, 
William S. Jordan, III, Christopher J. Peters, Tracy A. Thomas, and the participants 
in the Fall 2017 Northeast Ohio Faculty Colloquium for their valuable comments on 
earlier drafts of this article.  Any and all defects are solely the author’s. 
244    UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 16, No. 2 
 
4. Organization .................................................................................276 
C. Law School Strategic Planning ........................................................276 
V. A LAW SCHOOL CHANGE PROCESS MODEL ........................................282 
A. The Participants ...............................................................................282 
1. The Dean ......................................................................................283 
2. The Entire Law Faculty................................................................283 
3. The Conveners Team ...................................................................284 
4. The Internal Leveraging Team (Innovators) ................................285 
5. The External Leveraging Team (Catalysts) .................................286 
B. The Stages of a Change Process Model ...........................................286 
1. Stage 1: Initiation .........................................................................288 
2. Stage 2: Convening ......................................................................289 
3. Stage 3: Identify & Refine Opportunities for Leveraging ...........295 
4. Stage 4: Obtaining Team Agreement On Prioritization and 
Recommendations ................................................................................299 
5. Stage 5: Update and Integrate Strategy in Light of Prioritized 
Opportunities .......................................................................................300 
6. Stage 6: Implement and Monitor .................................................301 
7. Stage 7: System Reset and Repeat ...............................................301 




Consider a world in which law school enrollment plummets twenty-nine 
percent over a six-year period and the reduced levels are viewed as “the new 
reality for legal education.”1  Some law schools become so desperate for 
students that they no longer even require applicants to take the LSAT.2  Or 
consider another situation where, ten months after graduation, only seventy-
three percent of law school graduates are employed full-time in long-term 
jobs that either require bar passage or consider a J.D. to be an advantage.3  Or 
                                                          
1  Karen Sloan, Number of Students Enrolling in Law School Basically Flat, 




2  Sarah Randazzo, Law Schools Say: Please Come, No LSAT Required, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/law-schools-say-please-come-no-
lsat-required-1512556201 [https://perma.cc/N35U-MM9K]. 
3  ABA Legal Education Section Releases Employment Data for Graduating 
Law Class of 2016, AM. BAR ASS'N (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_a
 




consider a situation in which the quality of recent law graduates is so low 
that the average Multistate Bar Exam Score reaches its lowest level ever.4  
For the first time ever, within a period of about one year, three ABA 
accredited law schools effectively announce that they are closing.5  
Unfortunately, these situations constitute the current reality—and U.S. law 
schools are in the middle of it. 
For decades, numerous authors have bemoaned the state of U.S. legal 
education.6  Each has made constructive suggestions about what U.S. law 
schools should do about it.7  Some have focused on teaching techniques and 
                                                                                                                                         
dmissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2017_employment_data_2016_graduates_news_rele
ase.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EJA-KCAF]. 
4  Derek Muller, February 2017 MBE bar scores collapse to all-time record low 
in test history, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY BLOG (Apr. 7, 2017), 
http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/?month=april-2017&view=calendar 
[https://perma.cc/2SUW-MMD2]. 
5  The first two ABA law schools to announce closure in 2017 were Whittier 
Law School and Charlotte Law School.  See Sonali Kohli, Rosanna Xia, & Theresa 
Watanabe, Whittier Law School is closing, due in part to low student achievement. 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017), http://beta.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-edu-
whittier-law-school-closing-20170420-story.html [https://perma.cc/BQ82-98G9] 
(announcing the school’s apparent shutdown after a series of problems); Elizabeth 
Olson, For-Profit Charlotte School of Law Closes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/business/dealbook/for-profit-charlotte-school-
of-law-closes.html [https://perma.cc/N2D7-JTVP].  The third ABA law school to 
“effectively” announce that they were closing is Valparasio Law School when they 
announced that they were “suspending admissions” and exploring “alternative 
possibilities.”  Andrew Clark, Valparaiso University law school stops admissions, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2017/11/16/valparaiso-university-law-school-
admission-suspended/872130001/ [https://perma.cc/8L95-68CZ]. 
6  See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Butterfly Effects: The Possibilities of Law 
Teaching in a Democracy, 41 DUKE L.J. 741, 786–92 (1992) (discussing several 
ways that academization has affected legal education); Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity 
Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law Students, The Public, and the Legal 
Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. Rev. 219, 220–21 (2007) (arguing that law schools are 
flooding the job market with lawyers lacking practical skills); Harry T. Edwards, The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) (criticizing the lack of cohesion between legal education and 
the culture of law firms); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 
1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 211–12 (1948) (describing several problems with the 
traditional "case teaching" method in law schools). 
7  See, e.g., Richard E. Redding, The Legal Academy Under Erasure, 64 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 359, 363–64 (2015) (arguing for specific reforms tied to practical skills 
training); Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite 
Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 
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subject matter.8  Some have focused on legal scholarship.9  Some have 
focused on clinical education and access to justice.10  Yet others have 
focused on how to improve the recruiting of historically underrepresented 
groups.11  Some have even recommended completely redesigning U.S. legal 
education.12  Even though U.S. law schools have responded to many of these 
                                                                                                                                         
705, 707–08 (1997) (arguing that more mentoring by law professors would combat 
many ethical issues faced by new lawyers). 
8  See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-five Theses: Systemic Reforms of 
American Legal Education and Licensure, 64 S.C. L. REV. 55, 140–41 (2012) 
[hereinafter Newton I] (critiquing problems in law school curricula, teaching 
methods, and student assessments); Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in 
Hard Times: The Recession, Practical Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 598, 611–13 (2010) (calling for more practical training in law 
schools in response to needs of legal job market). 
9  See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law 
Faculties’ Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of Practical 
Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 105, 148–49 
(2010) [hereinafter Newton II] (arguing that law schools must less on professors' 
scholarship); Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 
YALE L.J. 1113, 1117–19 (1981) (providing examples criticizing legal scholarship); 
Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327–29 (2002) 
(assessing the current state of law school scholarship). 
10  See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal 
Education and Research, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, 548–50 (2013). 
11  See, e.g., Meera E. Deo, Looking Forward to Diversity in Legal Academia, 29 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 352, 354–55 (2014) (providing overview of 
diversity in legal academia and the underrepresentation of women of color); Charles 
R. Lawrence III, Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Need for Voluntary 
Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 429, 430–31 (1986) (calling for law schools to open more 
positions for minority professors); Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market 
Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727, 728–32 (2000) (analyzing 
underrepresentation of minorities in legal academia from a monopoly standpoint); 
Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law 
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 410 (2004) (analyzing the effects of affirmative 
action policies on African American law school applicants); Linda F. Wightman, The 
Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences 
of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1, 10 (1997) (comparing outcomes for minority students with or without 
affirmative action policies). 
12  See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: 
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 194–202 (2007) (providing examples 
and recommendations for a new integrated legal education); ROY STUCKEY ET AL., 
BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROADMAP 1–5 (2007) 
(advocating for long overdue reforms in legal education); David R. Barnhizer, 
Redesigning the American Law School, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 249, 309–10 (2010) 
(discussing how competition will force law school reform); Paul Campos, 
 




suggestions, their responses typically have been small relative to the dramatic 
changes occurring across society.  As a result, the perceived value of a U.S. 
legal education has continued to deteriorate. 
To date, most commentators have assumed that U.S. law schools (and 
law faculty) are intentionally resistant to change.13  However, it is possible 
that U.S. law schools are otherwise inhibited from quickly and distinctively 
adapting.  This prospect presents some intriguing questions.  What is the 
origin of this apparent inability of U.S. law schools to evolve faster and more 
distinctively?  Even more fundamentally, what can be done to address these 
conditions to facilitate meaningful change within U.S. law schools? 
In looking to answer these questions, the present Article begins by 
focusing on two complementary theoretical explanations.  One explanation is 
based upon behavioral economics and psychology.14  Among other things, 
this approach focuses on decision-making within the context of individual 
and group psychology.15  Another explanation is based upon sociological 
institutional theory, and focuses on the institutionalization of law and legal 
                                                                                                                                         
Perspectives on Legal Education Reform: The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 177, 222–23 (2013) (arguing for reforms of unsustainable 
law school costs); Newton I, supra note 8, at 140–41 (arguing for systemic reforms 
in law schools). 
13  See Barnhizer, supra note 12, at 252 (assuming a conscious choice to change 
in stating that “[t]he challenge is whether law schools will adapt to the changing 
environment through intelligent strategic choice or ignore the dynamics of change.”); 
Newton I, supra note 8, at 56 (describing law school “intransigence” in response to 
calls for reform); STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 1 (assuming voluntary choice to 
change “if legal educators step back and consider how they can most effectively 
prepare students for practice.”); see also Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law 
School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of Competition and 
Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 515, 520 (assuming a cognitive decision resulting 
from a law school culture that “discourages faculty from investing the time and 
intellectual resources necessary to make . . . reforms work”). 
14  See generally Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and 
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1558 (1998) (interpreting an economic analysis of 
law to show its connections with psychology). 
15  Although beyond the scope of the current paper, the distinction between 
institutional theory and behavioral economics is surprisingly subtle.  According to 
Christine Oliver, Sustainable Competitive Advantage: Combining Institutional and 
Resource Based Views, STRATEGIC MGMT. J., 697, 699 (1997), “[i]nstitutional 
theorists emphasize the extent to which firm behavior is complaint, habitual, 
unreflective, and socially defined.”  Id.  In contrast, behavioral economics modify 
the rational assumptions of classical economics in favor of “assumptions of ‘bounded 
rationality,’ ‘bounded willpower,’ and ‘bounded self-interest.’” Posner, supra note 
14, at 1553.  Therefore, both institutional theory and behavioral economics reject 
purely rational decision-making by focusing on particular limitations. 
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education.16  Incorporating both of these explanations, this Article argues that 
individual U.S. law schools actually can adapt faster and better.  However, 
this requires U.S. law schools to address internal challenges while also 
pursing externally-focused, distinctive, and meaningful change.  Within this 
context, the last Section of this Article proposes a change process model for 
U.S. law schools to overcome embedded institutional and behavioral 
resistance to change. 
To be clear, the present Article does not place blame on anyone.  It also 
does not recommend any universal survival strategy for all U.S. law schools.  
Given the different stakeholders, resources, and market positions of various 
U.S. law schools, there is no “one size fits all” solution.  Instead, this Article 
focuses on how to improve law school decision-making processes to better 
establish a meaningful external market focus, and formulate unique and 
valuable strategies.  It all begins by applying behavioral economics and 
institutional theory, and ends with a process intended to facilitate uniquely 
meaningful innovations by individual law schools.   
 
II. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL RESISTANCE TO 
CHANGE 
 
Ordinarily, most people assume that human beings—including law 
faculty—are completely rational.  This certainly aligns with the well-
established assumptions of classical economics.  This perspective “assumes 
that a person [or entity] can perfectly process available information about 
alternative courses of action, and can rank possible outcomes in order of 
expected utility . . . [and then] choose the course of action that will maximize 
[the] expected utility . . . .”17  Most recommendations for change in U.S. law 
schools clearly assume these capabilities.18  However, are they correct? 
Critics of classical economics have long questioned whether the 
assumption of rationality overstates its case and “exaggerates actual human 
cognitive capacities.”19  For these critics, a “richer model . . . would look to 
psychology to develop a more realistic view of cognitive processes, and also 
look to sociology to obtain a more accurate picture of social influences on 
                                                          
16  W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 2, 48–49 (David 
Whetten et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter SCOTT I]. 
17  Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: 
A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989). 
18  See generally Barnhizer, supra note 12, at 252; Newton I, supra note 8, at 56; 
STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 1; Sturm & Guinier, supra note 13. 
19  Ellickson, supra note 17, at 23. 




human behavior.”20  This is exactly what the present Article attempts to do.  
The Article first looks at behavioral economics and psychology to explain 
distortions in individual and group decision-making.21  The Article then 
looks at institutional theory to examine how social structures, interactions 
and pressures shape—and sometimes dictate—organizational behavior.22  As 
applied to U.S. law schools, both approaches provide insight into the 
mechanisms that may be distorting the ability of individual law schools to 
adapt faster and better.  Collectively, they also suggest some solutions.23  
 
A. Behavioral Economics and Psychology. 
 
Behavioral economics “is [classical] economics minus the assumption 
that people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions.”24  In this way, 
behavioral economics diverges from classical economics by recognizing that 
individual decision-makers are often subject to significant limitations.  These 
limitations are based upon psychology and often explain why individuals or 
groups deviate from the traditional expectations of classical economics.  
These key limitations are: bounded rationality; bounded willpower; and 
bounded self-interest.25 
The first assumption of behavioral economics is bounded rationality.  
Actually, a better name would be “bounded cognitive capacity.”  Bounded 
rationality refers to the widely recognized limitation “that human cognitive 
abilities are not infinite.”26  Humans do not have limitless cognitive abilities, 
energy, or memory.27  As a result, people are often forced to use various 
coping mechanisms.28  These often lead to deviations from strictly rational 
decision-making.   
For instance, due to bounded rationality, law faculty members would not 
be expected to easily make decisions that: consciously and fully comprehend 
the complexity of changes in society; then reconcile these changes with the 
demands of the legal profession; then propose solutions that meet the 
requirements of legal education; and then figure out how the faculty 
                                                          
20  Id.; see also Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism 
About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 470–74 (1974) (contrasting Posner's theory 
with psychology and sociology). 
21  See infra Part II.A. 
22  See infra Part II.B; see also Oliver, supra note 15.  
23  See infra Part V.B. 
24  Posner, supra note 14, at 1551–52. 
25  See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–77 (1998); see also Posner, supra note 14, at 1553–58. 
26  Jolls et al., supra note 25, at 1477.  
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
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member’s individual law school can establish a distinctive and valuable 
approach for the external (student) market.  The cognitive requirements are 
simply too high.  As such, bounded rationality alone may provide a 
significant explanation for the absence of more adaptive behavior by U.S. 
law schools. 
The second assumption of behavioral economics is bounded willpower.  
Bounded willpower refers to the tendency of people to pursue convenient, 
short-term, gratification even where this clearly undermines achieving more 
rationally important long-term goals.29 Recognition that bounded willpower 
exists is shown whenever a person decides to take short-term precautions in 
order to achieve more important long-term goals.  For instance, many people 
join Weight Watchers in order to successfully reduce the consumption of 
food and ultimately lose weight.  These people recognize the need to avoid 
the temptation of eating unhealthy foods, but also understand that their own 
bounded willpower will not stop them from consuming too much unhealthy 
food.  Additional steps are therefore necessary—like joining Weight 
Watchers.  The rational thoughts are present but the short-term will is often 
lacking.30   
One example of how bounded willpower might present challenges to law 
faculty would be in limiting the extent to which a law school decides to 
pursue unique and innovative programs.  For law faculty, bounded willpower 
could certainly play a role in deciding whether to pursue bold, distinctive, 
changes versus only making changes sufficient to “kick the can down the 
road.”  In the current environment for legal education, few people would 
rationally expect minimal adaptation by law schools to be sufficient to 
achieve long term goals—like survival.  Prompt and decisive approaches are 
certainly more likely to serve the long-term interests of both the individual 
law school and the faculty in general.  However, bounded willpower suggests 
that minimally sufficient adaptation avoids the tougher task of having to 
confront—and sometimes renegotiate—the expectations and relative value of 
faculty contributions.  For instance, rather than having to definitively resolve 
such issues as the relative role and value of academics versus practitioners in 
legal education, it is far easier for law faculties to pursue less ambitious 
goals.  As such, bounded willpower undermines the ability of law faculty to 
resolve the tougher issues and pursue more ambitious change.   
In similar fashion, bounded willpower also presents issues as to the 
extent to which an individual law school can sustain a focus on external 
market opportunities.  As a practical matter, the unbridled pursuit of external 
market opportunities presents an unknown threat to the established 
relationships across law faculty.  Consequently, rather than truly making a 
transition to a sustained market-led focus, bounded willpower would suggest 
                                                          
29  Id. at 1479. 
30  Id. 




that law faculty would focus on making incremental internal improvements 
in curricular offerings—even though an external market-led approach would 
be more ambitious, distinctive and responsive. 
The third assumption of behavioral economics is bounded self-interest.  
This assumption is less relevant for present purposes.  Bounded self-interest 
refers to the common recognition that most people care about more than just 
themselves.  Consequently, individuals tend to pursue utility functions that 
extend beyond mere self-interest.31  As applied to law faculty, bounded self-
interest is probably the clearest example of why the assumptions of classical 
economics are at least partially erroneous.  Factually speaking, the objective 
manifestations of most law faculty would suggest that they deeply care about 
society, the profession, their students, and the law.  Unlike the other bounded 
limitations, bounded self-interest would militate in favor of meaningful law 
school adaptation—not against it. 
Combining these assumptions, behavioral economics provides a 
relatively straightforward explanation for the resistance of law faculty to 
change.  Both bounded rationality and bounded willpower are limited by the 
prospective complexity and consequences of decisions.  Under the 
circumstances, it is completely understandable why law faculties might tend 
to maintain an internally focused status quo bias. The behavior is 
understandable even if not strictly rational.  
In sharp contrast, the vilification of law faculty by some critics rests 
upon the belief that the resistance to change is actually part of a self-
centered, rational, power play by law faculty.32  For example, some critics 
claim that: 
 
[T]enured law professors . . . [rationally] seek to serve their 
professional and economic interests at the expense of their 
students’ best interest, [rationally] have captured law schools 
and the American Bar Association’s (ABA) accrediting 
process . . . . [Law professors have also rationally demanded] 
increased faculty sizes and salaries, and their focus on 
scholarly work . . . [that] only diverts professors from their 
teaching responsibilities.  Law faculties [rationally] 
instituted allegedly self-serving practices, such as hiring 
                                                          
31  Jolls et al., supra note 25, at 1479. 
32  See, e.g., Redding, supra note 7, at 365; see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, 
FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, 44–51 (2012) [hereinafter TAMANAHA I] (discussing 
problems with law school professors being overpaid for doing less work); Campos, 
supra note 12, at 186 (discussing how law school faculty’s demands have driven up 
tuition costs). 
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scholars instead of professionals who can provide practical 
lawyering skills training to students.33 
 
As tempting as it might be to throw tenured law faculty under the bus, 
behavioral economics suggests that these criticisms may be overstated.  
Objectively, there may be greater room for corrective action.   
For instance, to date, suggestions to improve law schools have only 
rarely included  mechanisms to  mitigate the inherent faculty uncertainties 
present in prospective change.34  However, where there is “uncertainty 
regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform,”35 the behavioral 
economics literature recognizes that a status quo bias will likely exist.  More 
specifically, “there is a bias toward the status quo (and hence against 
efficiency-enhancing reforms) whenever some of the individual gainers and 
losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand.”36  This insight alone 
suggests that focus on decisional processes and results—as proposed by this 
Article—should go further toward achieving meaningful change than simply 
explaining what law schools should do.  Greater attention should be paid to 
how law schools can achieve it. 
In summary then, behavioral economics would suggest that status quo 
bias can become more manageable by addressing (or minimizing): cognitive 
issues (related to bounded rationality), short-term priority and convenience 
issues (related to bounded willpower), and individual uncertainty presented 
by aggressive organizational change.  
 
B. Institutional Theory and Institutionalization 
 
Like behavioral economics, new institutional theory (from within 
sociology) also focuses on the limitations of decision-making.  However, 
institutional theory generally focuses on the interaction of institutional 
structures and relationships to explain the resulting anomalies.  In this regard, 
both behavioral economics and institutional theory are complementary to 
                                                          
33  Redding, supra note 7, at 361–63. 
34  A mechanism to address uncertainties inherent in change is incorporated in 
the model proposed in the current article.  Cf. John C. Weistart, The Law School 
Curriculum: The Process of Reform, 36 DUKE L.J. 317 (1987) (stating that “[t]here is 
an appearance of great ferment in discussions of the American Law School and its 
curriculum.  Proposals for reform abound . . . . Only a few of the proposals put forth 
to date are merely fanciful . . . . Curriculum planning, however, takes place in a 
world of restraints and costs.  Despite the obviousness of this point, it has received 
little attention in the present discussion.”). 
35  Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in 
the Presence of Uncertainty, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1146, 1146 (1991). 
36  Id. 




each other.  Both can be used to explain, and potentially address, the failure 
of law schools to adapt faster and better.  Indeed, both assume limitations on 
the cognitive capabilities of decision-makers.  While behavioral economics 
relies upon psychological foundations, institutional theory relies upon 
sociological foundations. 
In the beginning, “old” institutional theory focused on the processes by 
which organizations sometimes consciously and rationally deviate from their 
stated goals.37  In this regard, “to institutionalize” means “to infuse with 
value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand.”38  In old 
institutionalism, “issues of influence, coalitions, and competing values were 
central, along with power and informal structures.”39  Put differently, old 
institutional theory assumed the existence of conscious, rational, reasons for 
organizational behavior. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, “new” institutional theory developed.40  
New institutional theory (and subsequent versions) recognizes that 
organizational behavior is not always determined by conscious 
“technological imperatives” and “resource dependencies.”41  Ultimately, 
organizations are subject to institutional forces that consist of “[r]egulative 
systems, normative systems, and cultural-cognitive systems.”42  Together, 
these three pillars of institutionalism “form a continuum moving ‘from the 
conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken for 
granted.’”43  In many ways, new institutional theory is an organization-level 
analogue to “groupthink” theory (where the primary concern of individuals is 
                                                          
37  See SCOTT I, supra note 16, at 21 (discussing how institutional theory 
originated in economic theory in the late nineteenth century as a challenge to “the 
conventional canon that economics could be reduced to a set of universal laws”).  It 
was not until the 1930s or 1940s that sociology adapted the concepts to more closely 
analyze the behavior of organizations.  See generally Philip Selznick, 
Institutionalism “Old” and “New”, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 270 (1996) (analyzing the 
history of older to newer institutional theory).   
38  PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
INTERPRETATION 17 (1957); see also W. Richard Scott, The Adolescence of 
Institutional Theory, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q., 493, 493–94 (1987) [hereinafter Scott II] 
(providing historical background on Selznick’s institutional theory research). 
39  Royston Greenwood & C.R. Hinings, Understanding Radical Organizational 
Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism, 21 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 1022, 1022 (1996). 
40  SCOTT I, supra note 16, at xix. 
41  W. Richard Scott, Approaching Adulthood: The Maturity of Institutional 
Theory, 37 THEORY & SOC’Y 427, 427 (2008). 
42  SCOTT I, supra note 16, at 51. 
43  Id. (citation omitted). 
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“conformity to group values and ethics” sometimes at the expense of task-
conscious decision-making).44 
Pursuant to new institutional theory, some organizational decision-
making results from taken-for-granted institutionalized assumptions and 
industry-wide (field-level) pressures.45  As such, institutionalization is “a 
social process by which individuals [within organizations] come to accept a 
shared definition of social reality—a conception whose validity is seen as 
independent of the actor’s own views or actions but is taken for granted as 
defining the ‘way things are’ and/or the ‘way things are to be done.’”46  
In fact, new institutional theory recognizes that “[m]any formal 
organizational structures arise as reflections of rationalized institutional 
rules.”47 New institutional theory defines “rationalized institutional rules” as 
those that are cloaked in apparent legitimacy without critical evaluation (or 
re-evaluation) of their relationship to the organization’s stated goals.  In this 
way, rationalized institutional rules function as “myths which organizations 
incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival 
prospects [without being directly linked to better serving the organization’s 
stated goals].”48  Of course, this raises the rather fundamental question of 
how once independently-thinking and competitive organizations ever permit 
themselves to be subject to such collectivist institutional control.  How can 
this happen? 
According to new institutional theory, as entities increasingly coalesce 
into a field, individual organizational perspectives and activities naturally 
tend to align with the collective group.  As aptly stated by DiMaggio and 
Powell: 
 
Once disparate organizations in the same line of business 
[such as individual law schools] are structured into an actual 
field (as . . . by competition, the state, or the professions), 
                                                          
44  See generally Marlene E. Turner & Anthony R. Pratkanis, Twenty-five Years 
of Groupthink Theory and Research: Lessons from the Evaluation of a Theory, 73 
ORG. BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 105–06 (1998) (defining 
“groupthink” and analyzing its effects on decision-making processes).   
45  Technically speaking, “field” and “industry” are not equivalent.  According to 
Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cade Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 
147, 152 (1983), a “field” is broader than “industry.”  However, for the current 
purposes, the distinction is not considered significant.   
46  Scott II, supra note 38, at 496. 
47  John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal 
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340 (1977). 
48  Id. 




powerful forces emerge that lead them to become more 
similar to one another.49 
 
In this regard, an institutional “field” is a community of organizations or 
individuals that “directly interact with one another or are influenced by each 
other in a meaningful way.”50  
As a field evolves, constituent organizations tend to increasingly align 
and incorporate common meanings in reference to each other.  In the process, 
organizational focus tends to shift from competitively serving the needs of 
the external market to simply integrating the organization into the collective 
expectations of the field.51  Individual competition evolves into group 
compliance.  This integration is achieved to greater or lesser extent through 
pressures that can be coercive, normative, or result from the inherent 
uncertainty of the given task.52  Over time these pressures provide the 
foundations for “institutions” that seek to reinforce and substitute inter-
organizational alignment for individual organizational innovation.   
To some extent, U.S. legal education is a great example of how the 
institutionalization of a field can progress.  At the time of the American 
Revolution, the training of lawyers was distributed across unregulated, 
individual, apprenticeships.53  There were no requirements for formal legal 
education.  However, over time, some requirements for legal apprenticeships 
became more formalized.  Eventually, students recognized some 
apprenticeships as being better than others.  This led some of the individual 
apprenticeships to grow and transition into practice oriented private law 
schools.54  The field of legal education began to coalesce.  Next, the 
establishment of the field of legal education attracted additional participants 
in the form of offerings by some liberal arts colleges.    
By the early nineteenth century, the established colleges began to absorb 
the practice-based law schools into the emerging educational institutions.55  
                                                          
49  DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 45, at 148. 
50  Royston Greenwood, Roy Suddaby & C.R. Hinings, Theorizing Change: The 
Role of Professional Associations in the Transformation of Institutionalized Fields, 
45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 58, 59 (2002). 
51  Id. 
52  Technically, the sources of institutional homogenization are coercive 
isomorphism, normative isomorphism and mimetic isomorphism.  However, for 
current purposes, these terms-of-art were deemed to be unnecessary.  See Eshani 
Beddewela & Jenny Fairbrass, Seeking Legitimacy Through CSR: Institutional 
Pressures and Corporate Responses of Multinationals in Sri Lanka, 136 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 503, 506 (2016). 
53  ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 
1850S TO THE 1980S 3 (1983). 
54  Id. 
55  Id. at 5. 
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By the 1850s, “[l]aw was becoming a boom industry.”56  As the century 
progressed, even though most lawyers were still being trained “on-the-job,” 
law schools claimed to offer a more “systematic, academic experience 
designed to upgrade the intellectual quality of law and lawyers and thus 
enhance their professional status.”57  Not coincidentally, the new law school 
offerings responded to calls “for a more rigorous training and more 
systematic bar examinations.”58  Standardization spread.  By the late 1890s, 
increasingly, the admission to the bar for most states required some type of 
formal legal studies and passage of a bar examination.59  As the field of legal 
education expanded, institutional forces also increased.  
As might be expected, over the ensuing decades, the institutional 
pressures on legal education continued to increase.   However, there was still 
variance in the form of legal studies.60  The duration of legal studies also 
varied.61  But once Harvard emerged as the leading U.S. law school “almost 
all [other] university-affiliated schools were only too anxious to emulate its 
developments.”62  The institutionalization of legal education progressed even 
further. 
Consequently, although by the early 1900s  there continued to be battles 
between the doctrinal focus of Harvard, and the practical focus of others, the 
alignment of legal educational organizations continued to increase.63  With 
the help of the ABA Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the 
Bar, the further institutionalization of U.S. legal education was well on its 
way.64 
By 1952, the U.S. Department of Education had become the national 
agency responsible for the accreditation of U.S. law schools.65  In turn, the 
U.S. Department of Education delegated most accreditation issues to another 
institution: the Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to 
                                                          
56  Id. at 22. 
57  Id. at 24. 
58  Id. at 25. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. at 36–37, 39. 
61  Id. at 36–37. 
62  Id. at 39.  As a practical matter, it should be noted that the emulative aspect of 
law school institutionalization likely perpetuates the hierarchical “pecking order” 
among schools while also providing institutionalized, isomorphic, pressures.  
Consequently, even though institutionalized, it would not be surprising to find 
meaningful innovations within leading law schools eventually percolating down to 
other law schools.   
63  See STEVENS, supra note 53, at 39. 
64  Id. at 93. 
65  STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS v 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2015-2016). 




the Bar.66  Although technically independent, the Council was (and still is) 
related to a section of the ABA—yet another institution.  Today, the Council 
has a network of affiliate organizations/institutions to which most U.S. law 
schools belong.  These include: The Association of American of Law 
Schools (AALS); Clinical Legal Education Association (CLEA); Law School 
Admission Council (LSAC); National Association of Law Placement 
(NALP); and National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE).67  Even if 
these institutions do not have express regulatory power over U.S. law 
schools, they still play important normative roles.68  Each has membership 
requirements and provides a peer-mechanism for institutional alignment—
even where the individual law school might have divergent interests.  
Of course, in addition to the external institutional pressures listed above, 
law schools also must navigate internal pressures.  As noted previously, 
institutional pressures “are transported by various carriers—cultures, 
structures, and routines—and they operate at multiple levels.”69  Thus, 
institutional pressures can be internally conveyed by individual faculty—in 
addition to the external pressures transmitted by way of peer organizations, 
professional associations, and regulators.  In this way, whether intended or 
not, various taken-for-granted assumptions regarding the proper approach to 
legal education are routinely internalized into law school decision-making. 
 Making matters even more problematic is that the taken-for-granted 
assumptions in institutionalized fields are not completely devoid of any 
collective validity.  In fact, many of the institutionalized assumptions were 
once completely valid but are often now outdated.  As such, the taken-for-
granted assumptions often simply represent a field-wide consensus 
established long-ago regarding such things as:   
 
 the proper scope of legal education;  
 the proper ways of educating law students; and  
 what constitutes the practice of law.  
 
In regard to each of these topics (and many more), institutional theory would 
posit that legal education has “become defined by shared systems of 
                                                          
66  Id. 
67  Council Meetings, ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the 
Bar, Meeting held at Loews Santa Monica Beach Hotel, Santa Monica, California, 
AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 9–11, 2017), 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/about_us/leadership/council_me
etings.html [https://perma.cc/E2GY-HDST]. 
68  It is asserted that the forces are actually both normative and mimetic.  
However, for the current purposes, it is not deemed necessary to delve more deeply 
into the distinction between these types of institutional forces. 
69  SCOTT I, supra note 16, at 48. 
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meaning.”70  Law schools are deeply embedded in their own institutionalized 
networks of beliefs, cultural schemes, and conventions71—even while the 
external environment has called for change.  Unfortunately, due to the 
institutionalization process, the ability of individual law schools to 
meaningfully adapt has been buried under the convergence of multiple 
institutions throughout the field of legal education.  
Moreover, notably absent from any of the institutional mechanisms is 
any means to rapidly reevaluate and update the ingrained assumptions.  
There is little, if any, institutional consideration about the continuing validity 
of the foundational assumptions.  There also is little awareness of how 
individual law schools can provide uniquely superior value to identified 
groups of potential law students.  As a result, the taken-for-granted 
assumptions persist even if some of them no longer completely align with the 
stated purpose of the individual law school or goals of their potential law 
students.  For these reasons, institutionalization often results in industry-wide 
stasis and organizational resistance to change.  
 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL SHOCKS, CARRYING CAPACITY, AND INDIVIDUAL 
LAW SCHOOL PERSPECTIVES 
 
As previously explained, both behavioral economics and institutional 
theory provide ample explanations for why some organizations resist change.  
As part of both approaches, otherwise rational and caring decision-makers 
can steadfastly rationalize a staunch defense of the status quo or only agree to 
incremental change.  For these individuals, there is little imperative to 
embrace distinctive and meaningful change.  However, this can needlessly 
lead to catastrophic consequences when the external environment suddenly is 
subjected to a dramatic shock. 
As an initial matter, a dramatic change in the demand for legal education 
does not impact all U.S. law schools equally.  Changes that could be fatal to 
some law schools (like Whittier, Charlotte, and Valparaiso) are likely to be 
minor inconveniences for others.  As such, for some law schools, the best 
approach truly might be to simply do nothing.  These lucky schools can 
simply wait for the incremental industry-wide collective adaptation to spread 
across the entire field of legal education.  In the very least, this approach 
conveniently utilizes existing relationships and mechanisms.  Presumably, 
given the relative lack of law school mobility in rankings,72 this approach 
                                                          
70  Id. 
71  Hans Hasselbladh & Jannis Kallinikos, The Project of Rationalization: A 
Critique and Reappraisal of Neo-Institutionalism in Organizational Studies, 21 ORG. 
STUD. 697, 698 (2000). 
72  See generally David C. Yamada, Same Old, Same Old: Law School Rankings 
and the Affirmation of Hierarchy, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249 (1997). 




would also reinforce the status quo.  Under these circumstances, some lucky 
individual law schools might justifiably scoff at the prospect of pursuing 
individual, distinctive, change.  However, for other law schools, the failure to 
adapt could have significant negative consequences. 
As explained previously, all other things being held equal, 
institutionalization simply enables all organizations within a field to align 
and win (even if some stakeholders are sometimes not afforded optimal value 
or opportunities).  As long as the external environment essentially remains 
the same, extreme institutional pressures simply remove the need for 
constituent organizations to meaningfully compete or pursue distinct 
advantages.  Indeed, even if the external environment does change, some 
lucky individual organizations will likely persist—even if their entire 
industry has otherwise completely collapsed! 
For example, the U.S. railroad industry is frequently referenced for 
collapsing due to its own failure to adapt to external environmental 
changes.73  During the late 1800s, the railroads were considered 
indispensable to the U.S. economy as a driver of commerce through 
transportation.74  Had the U.S. railroads simply defined their industry 
broadly—as transportation—they easily could have developed and controlled 
U.S. industry as it developed into new forms.  But the railroads did not do 
that.  They failed to keep up with the external market changes and the 
railroad industry ultimately collapsed.75   
The indictment of industries like the railroads was concisely summarized 
by Theodore Levitt in his classic 1960 Harvard Business Review article76 as 
follows: 
 
Every major industry was once a growth industry.  But some 
that are now riding a wave of growth enthusiasm are very 
much in the shadow of decline.  Others which are thought of 
as seasoned growth industries have actually stopped 
growing.  In every case, the reason that growth is 
threatened, slowed or stopped is not because the market is 
saturated. It is because there is a failure of management.77  
 
Undoubtedly, Professor Levitt was correct.  Ultimately, industry collapse is 
caused by the failure of organizations to adequately respond to the changing 
demands of the external market.  But even where an entire industry does 
collapse, there usually are at least some organizational survivors.  Despite the 
                                                          
73  Theodore Levitt, Marketing Myopia, HARVARD BUS. REV. 26, 26 (1960). 
74  Id. 
75  Id. at 27. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
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collapse of the U.S. railroad industry, the four largest U.S. railroads today 
still have revenues in excess of $9 billion dollars per year.78  Given that U.S. 
legal education is currently nowhere near systemic collapse, it is easy to see 
that some U.S. law schools (and law faculty) might rationally reject calls for 
individual distinctive change.79 
So, if there is nothing inherently wrong with some institutionalized 
organizations refusing to individually evolve, why should any individual 
U.S. law school seek to spend time and energy pursuing distinctive 
meaningful change?    The answer is given in that a dramatic shock has 
occurred to U.S. legal education.  Consequently, a disequilibrium currently 
exists in the carrying capacity of legal education.  Individual U.S. law 
schools now face a rather fundamental choice as to whether or not they 
should try to change.  Stronger organizations enjoy the luxury of time and do 
not face any serious threats to their survival.  However, weaker law schools 
face a time-sensitive imperative.  Overall, if few U.S. law schools 
meaningfully adapt, then the new environment will most certainly result in a 
decrease in the carrying-capacity of U.S. legal education.  Over time, 
survival of the fittest will mediate the market adjustment to the new, lower, 
carrying-capacity equilibrium.  
In contrast, if some otherwise weaker U.S. law schools are able to 
distinctively and meaningfully adapt, then the impact on the carrying-
capacity of U.S. legal education is far less obvious.  Carrying-capacity could 
even increase if the adapting law schools successfully communicate 
enhanced value to new groups of potential law students, or to old groups of 
law students in newly valued ways.  It all depends upon how uniquely 
successful the adapting U.S. schools are in pursuing, achieving, and 
maintaining meaningful differentiation.  
More specifically, the individual benefits of adaptation accruing to 
specific law schools will be affected by the extent to which the particular 
adaptation is valuable to the market as well as distinctive relative to other 
organizations within the field.  If everyone adapts in the exact same generic 
fashion, the benefits of any innovation will be spread across all organizations 
within the field.  The individual benefits will be minimized as they are spread 
across the established organizational pecking order.  However, individual law 
                                                          
78  Robert Wright, The Biggest North American Railroads, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 22, 
2011), https://www.ft.com/content/ba1227d4-ccd8-11e0-88fe-00144feabdc0 
[https://perma.cc/D8MR-PMHR]. 
79  Another way to look at this is to identify two schools of thought.  As noted by 
Frank H. Wu, “[o]ne insists that law schools are fundamentally fine . . . . Another 
contends that the educational program leading into legal practice is fundamentally 
flawed.”  Frank H. Wu, Reforming Law Schools: A Manifesto, 46 TOL. L. REV. 417, 
417 (2015).  The position of the current article is that both are correct—depending 
upon the individual school.   




schools that provide distinctive value to the market will uniquely enjoy the 
benefits.  As such, the extent of individual organizational benefits resulting 
from successful innovation will depend upon two things:   
 
1) the extent to which the organizational innovation is perceived by 
potential students as offering improved value over existing 
alternatives (both within and beyond legal education); and  
2) the extent to which other organizations within the field are able to 
meaningfully adopt and copy the new innovation. 
 
In sum then, there is nothing inherently wrong with some law schools 
deciding not to individually adapt.  For some lucky law schools, this 
represents a perfectly reasonable course of action.  For others, the failure to 
quickly and meaningfully adapt to the changed environment may lead to the 
failure of the organization.  Fortunately, successful individual adaptation has 
benefits beyond mere survival.  For individual law schools that successfully 
(and quickly) adapt in meaningful and distinctive ways, the schools will 
enjoy an improved comparative competitive position—regardless of their 
current rank or condition.  In the very least, the concept of “carrying 
capacity” strongly suggests that weaker U.S. law schools should be 
aggressively pursuing distinctive adaptation—rather than waiting.  The 
theoretical foundations for accomplishing this are discussed in the next 
Section. 
 
IV. ACHIEVING DISTINCTIVE AND MEANINGFUL CHANGE 
 
Having clarified the fundamental choice (and consequences) facing U.S. 
law schools, this Section discusses the theoretical aspects of distinctive and 
meaningful change.  First, the Section explains how institutional 
entrepreneurship enables change both within the institutional and (by 
extension) behavioral contexts.  However, merely achieving any change does 
not assure that the changes will necessarily create any distinctive benefit for 
the individual organization.  Consequently, this Section also examines the 
characteristics of resources that are most likely to provide sustainable, unique 
benefits for an individual school.  Finally, this Section examines the use of 
strategic planning to assure the alignment of potentially distinctive 
opportunities with the values, missions and resources of an individual law 
school and the external market.  
  
A. Enabling Change Through Institutional Entrepreneurs 
 
Institutional entrepreneurship (within Institutional Theory) is defined as 
the “activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional 
arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to 
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transform existing ones.”80  The change efforts can focus broadly across an 
entire field or focus narrowly within an individual institutionalized 
organization.  In either instance, institutional entrepreneurship is about 
figuring out how to navigate incumbent forces to facilitate organizational 
change.  This can include sources of both institutional and behavioral 
resistance to meaningful change. 
Although institutional entrepreneurship can be used across an entire 
range of potential institutional circumstances, the steps and configuration 
necessary to be successful will heavily depend upon the nature and 
complexity of relationships involved (both individual and organizational), as 
well as the relevant institutional pressures.  Consequently, there is no 
universal roadmap.  The specific steps necessary to be successful are goal- 
and context-dependent—perhaps even within an individual law school.  
Nonetheless, the basic concepts are the same.  The challenges, steps, and 
parties may vary widely. 
For these reasons, institutional entrepreneurs often start to pursue change 
by pre-determining viable paths and configurations of resources by which 
institutional change is more likely to occur.  To the extent that the prospect of 
potential change can be improved by being presold to key individuals, 
institutional entrepreneurs are likely to begin by constructing “chains of 
action” “with at least some pre-fabricated links.”81  These links channel 
“action through the shape and organization of those links” rather than by 
predetermining the ends to which they are put.82 
Applying these same concepts to the concerns of behavioral economics, 
institutional entrepreneurs can also seek to configure decision-making in 
such a way as to minimize concerns caused by bounded rationality and to 
increase the collective willpower to achieve meaningful change. 
For instance, if a particular initiative is going to require a change in state 
law to be successful, institutional entrepreneurs start by: determining how a 
bill is submitted; which committees are likely to be involved; which 
legislators will play a key role in bringing the bill to vote; which legislative 
support personnel would likely make recommendations regarding passage; 
whether any lobbyists are likely to support the bill; and whether the governor 
is likely to veto the bill if it is passed.  Once the “chains of action” have been 
determined, the institutional entrepreneurs would proceed to personally meet 
all of the individuals—even before a proposed bill has been drafted—in order 
to better determine the links that are most likely to enable a favorable result.  
Only after these chains of action have been established would the 
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institutional entrepreneurs actually start to draft and advocate for a particular 
bill.  To the extent possible, the bill would be “pre-wired” for success—if not 
also “pre-sold.” 
Similarly, institutional entrepreneurship can help individual law schools 
configure their own chains of action—without “[pre]determining the ends to 
which they are put.”83  For individual U.S. law schools seeking meaningful 
and distinctive organizational change (within existing ABA standards),84 the 
primary mechanism for such pre-fabricated links will inevitably involve the 
law faculty.  It is therefore critical to engage law faculty at the very 
beginning.  It is critical to determine whether there is sufficient faculty 
support for pursuing distinctive change.  It is also critical to provide a 
theoretically sound model that empowers institutional entrepreneurs to 
pursue meaningful opportunities.   
As a practical matter, this may be as easy as simply giving this Article to 
law faculty for their consideration.  However, it may also require additional 
preparation.  Faculty may face bounded rationality challenges or otherwise 
have questions or reservations.  Only after achieving a consensus supporting 
meaningful change, can institutional entrepreneurs start to assemble discrete 
teams to ultimately recommend specific options.  Of course, in order to 
explain how the overall process can work, it is also necessary to describe the 
techniques that can be used to successfully achieve the intended changes.  
Three fundamentally different resource mobilization techniques have 
been identified for institutional entrepreneurs to successfully enable 
institutional change.  Although each can be applied as an isolated approach, 
the techniques also can be utilized in concert.  According to Dorado, these 
three approaches to resource mobilization are: convening, accumulating, and 
leveraging.85 
The first technique, convening, is a process usually used for solving 
complex social problems.86  Convening is based upon the creation of a 
                                                          
83  Id. 
84  Because of the likely speed and urgency that is required for some U.S. law 
schools to meaningfully adapt to the changed external environment, this article is 
expressly limited to change occurring within existing ABA Accreditation 
requirements.  Industry-wide changes (such as changes to the ABA Accreditation 
requirements) would inherently require a greater degree of cooperation and 
coordination across U.S. law schools and various related institutions.  Ordinarily, this 
might be expected to result in delays.  
85  Silvia Dorado, Institutional Entrepreneurship, Partaking, and Convening, 26 
ORG. STUD. 385, 390 (2005).  By way of disclosure, Dorado’s 2005 article actually 
discusses three separate dimensions (resource mobilization, agency, and opportunity) 
to discuss “industrial change profiles.”  However, present article only focuses on 
resource mobilization.  This dramatically reduces the scope and complexity of the 
current article. 
86  Id. at 390. 
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collaborative initiative that is not focused on advocacy of any individual 
project.  “Instead, it involves convincing [participants] of the desirability and 
viability of collaborating to jumpstart the development of a solution to a 
problem.”87  Convening requires “politically skilled actors” who are 
instrumental in “bridging unaware, unsure or skeptical actors to explore the 
possibilities of cooperation.”88  The success of institutional entrepreneurs 
engaged in convening depends upon:  
 
(1) the credibility they have among the parties involved, (2) 
their familiarity with the problem being addressed, and (3) 
their position as a balanced or unbiased party.  They are also 
quick to appreciate the beneficial impact of mutual 
exchange, proficient at scanning the environment 
surrounding the collaboration, and skilled in appraising the 
consequences of contemplated future actions.89  
 
Given the professional and collegial nature of many law faculties, convening 
should be a key resource mobilization technique.  Rather than trying to tell 
faculty what should be done, convening constructively engages law faculties 
to collectively help formulate solutions to an agreed-upon change 
opportunity.  In the process, convening provides a mechanism to address, to 
the extent possible, complexity and commitment issues. 
Given the previously discussed impact of institutionalization on law 
school governance, the selection of one or more credible Conveners from 
within the law faculty is likely to be crucial to obtaining full faculty 
engagement and legitimacy for pursuing meaningful solutions.  At the same 
time, in order to increase the likelihood of identifying the most innovative 
opportunities for distinctive meaningful change, it is clear that convening 
alone is unlikely to be sufficient.  
Although convening will provide engagement and legitimacy, the law 
faculty as a whole is unlikely to be the most qualified to identify and 
recommend external market opportunities.  Optimal opportunities for change 
will generally be identified by those who maintain an external market-
focused perspective.  This is fundamentally different from the typical 
perspective of large portions (but certainly not all) law faculty.  After all, few 
law faculty have ever studied marketing.  Even faculty with extensive private 
practice experience probably have little knowledge regarding the needs (or 
recruiting) of current law students.  To maintain a market-based view, it will 
be necessary to empower (and possibly educate) a group that naturally has an 
external customer-led focus.  Additionally, it will be necessary to use one of 
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the other two resource mobilization techniques within a broadly defined 
convening resource mobilization process—either accumulation or leveraging. 
Of course, within the traditionally collegial atmosphere of legal 
education, most law schools would tend to select approaches with which they 
are already familiar.  As a result, most law schools would naturally tend to 
select accumulation as the preferred means of pursuing change.  As the name 
suggests, “[a]ccumulation implies that support and acceptance emerge as the 
uncoordinated actions of countless actors probabilistically converge.”90  
Accumulation is based upon slowly developing a consensus across a field.91 
An example of accumulation, cited by Dorado, was the emergence of 
radio sponsorship advertising as the means by which radio transitioned from 
merely being point-to-point to being a major force in mass communication.92  
Originally, there was no plan to create radio sponsorship to support mass 
communication.  Instead, consensus gradually emerged as single-purpose 
operators of radio stations realized that they could achieve better outcomes 
by sponsoring radio programming rather than owning and operating their 
own stations.93   
As applied to U.S. law schools, accumulation would be appropriate 
where significant, but causally ambiguous, changes to standards would be 
desired.  For instance, if a specific law school thought that it might be 
appropriate to create an express exemption from bar passage requirements 
for schools whose students overwhelmingly come from underprivileged 
backgrounds, there would almost certainly need to be sustained discussion 
about the importance of economic diversity in the bar versus the purpose of 
having minimum bar passage requirements.  The success of the initiative 
would require building a consensus across multiple institutions from bar 
examiners to the ABA.   
Unfortunately, the use of accumulation is too closely aligned with a 
staunch defense of the status quo.  The slow pace of accumulation can 
provide an illusion of meaningful organizational change while really just 
drifting.  Therefore, the reliance upon accumulation presents special 
challenges when trying to respond to an environmental (market) shock. 
Just as with institutional forces in general, the accumulation resource 
mobilization technique relies upon a web of interconnections across the 
entire field (typical of professional occupations) to eventually facilitate 
changes.94  Using accumulation, there does not tend to be any conscious 
                                                          
90  Id. at 386; see also Andrew Van de Ven & Raghu Garud, Innovation and 
industry development: The Case of Cochlear Implants, 5 RES. ON TECH. 
INNOVATION, MGMT. AND POL’Y 1, 2–3 (1993). 
91  Dorado, supra note 85, at 408. 
92  Id. at 407. 
93  Id. at 401. 
94  Id. at 390. 
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focus.  The established institutional arrangements evolve through emerging 
consensus rather than through any conscious effort to identify external 
opportunities to add unique value.95  
To sidestep the pitfalls of accumulation, this Article suggests facilitating 
change within individual organizations and within the existing ABA 
Standards.  In this way, coordination across organizations (and with various 
institutions) is minimized.  By also narrowly framing the scope of potential 
changes within existing ABA standards, accumulation can be avoided as a 
resource mobilization technique.  Individual organizational efforts are 
therefore more likely to be both timely and successful.  
Where fast and distinctive solutions are desired (within existing rules), 
and where the options are relatively transparent to qualified individuals, a 
more appropriate resource mobilization technique is leveraging.96  As with 
convening, in leveraging, “[p]olitically skilled actors are the driving forces 
behind this process.”97  However, unlike convening, leverage involves 
advocacy for particular solutions.  Institutional entrepreneurs use their 
“access to, and skills in leveraging, the scarce and critical resources needed 
to mount political action.”98  Leveraging is typical “when actors strategically 
engage in institutional change processes.”99  This would appear to be 
particularly appropriate where there is a recognized need to rapid meaningful 
change. 
In sum then, using institutional entrepreneurship to facilitate meaningful 
change for individual law schools should probably utilize convening as the 
overall resource mobilization technique.  However, convening alone is 
unlikely to provide optimal results.  Instead, specialized groups should be 
empowered (and possibly educated) to use leveraging.  The leveraging 
should relate to unique and sustainable opportunities for the individual law 
school.  Of course, this raises the next rather obvious question regarding the 
characteristics of “unique and sustainable opportunities.”  This is specifically 
addressed below. 
 
B. The Characteristics of Meaningful Opportunities—VRIO. 
 
Although it might be crass to admit it, the success of all U.S. law schools 
relies in part upon economic fundamentals.  Given the professional 
orientation of law schools, there is a normative tendency to equate economic 
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success with simply providing a quality education.  However, the 
relationship is not so simple.  Economics and recruiting also play a role in 
law school success.  Even the very best law schools would cease to exist if 
their students were unable to perceive of any value in attending the particular 
school.  The task is even more difficult for schools that are not as widely 
recognized as being exceptional.  For some law schools, recruiting and 
communicating sufficient perceived value is a matter of life or death. 
The importance of perceived value and recruiting is even more important 
considering the correlation between a law school’s median entering LSAT 
score and the subsequent average bar passage rates.  Practically speaking, a 
law school’s median entering LSAT score correlates highly with the school’s 
eventual average bar passage rate.100  Whether or not there is a direct or 
indirect causal connection is beyond the scope of this Article.  The fact 
remains that median LSAT score and bar passage rates are perceived by 
some potential students as a measure of educational quality.  Raising median 
LSAT scores will therefore tend to increase (either directly or indirectly) 
both the subsequent bar passage rates and economic well-being of any 
individual law school.  
When viewed in this way, the secret to some individual law schools 
surviving is dependent upon their ability to provide a perceived superior 
value proposition to prospective students.  In this regard, prospective 
students do not ordinarily care how the superior value is achieved.  They 
only care that the particular offering has superior value.  In this specific 
regard, the business literature  recognizes two main perspectives that explain 
how domestic firms can succeed in this way:  the market-based view and the 
resource-based view.101   
The market-based view has its origins in industrial economics and 
“argues that conditions within an industry, to a large extent, determine firm 
strategy and performance.”102  Given the conditions and institutionalization 
within U.S. legal education today, the market-based view, by itself, offers 
little promise for law schools.  In contrast, the resource-based view “suggests 
that it is firm-specific differences that drive strategy and performance.”103  
                                                          
100  Paul L. Caron, LSAT Mean of 152 Correlates with 88% Eventual Bar Pass 
Rate (for 160, it’s 97%), TAXPROFBLOG (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2015/12/88-of-152-lsats-and-97-of-160-
lsats-eventually-pass-the-bar-.html [https://perma.cc/E4FR-5PKZ].  
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Strategy: a Focus on Emerging Economies, 39 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 920, 920 (2008); 
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The essence of the resource-based view is that the intentional configuration, 
acquisition, and deployment of firm resources can provide a specific firm 
with a uniquely competitive position.104  If done correctly, the development 
of unique firm resources will provide the basis for a sustainable competitive 
advantage.105  
One way to explain sustainable competitive advantage is as follows: 
 
A sustained competitive advantage exists when the value-
creating strategy [used by a particular law school] is 
currently not being implemented by an organization’s 
competitors or potential competitors and when these other 
organizations are not able to imitate, either through 
duplication or substitution, the benefits of the value-creating 
strategy . . . . It is the inability of other organizations to 
imitate that strategy that helps an organization achieve a 
sustained competitive advantage.106  
 
Within the resource-based view, a given strategy or potential opportunity can 
be a source of sustainable competitive advantage if it complies with the 
requirements of the “VRIO Framework.”107   
The VRIO framework (within the resource-based view) is based upon the 
premise that a sustainable competitive advantage can be achieved by 
organizations pursuing strategies where the firm successfully deploys its 
resources that are “valuable,” “rare,” “inimitable,” and “organizationally 
appropriate.”108  In this regard, “firm resources include all assets, capabilities, 
organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. 
controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement 
strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness.”109  Once again, the 
VRIO framework applies to all resources—big, little, ambitious, and 
mundane.   
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Importantly, one of the key resources for law schools is the law faculty.  
It is for this reason that individual uncertainty and status quo bias in 
behavioral economics presents such a critical issue for U.S. law schools.  The 
creation of law school value requires marrying the necessary firm 
resources—including law faculty —with an external market that recognizes 
the unique value.  Since law faculty is also integral to decision-making, the 
configuration of the “faculty resource” is far more complex than in 
traditional business organizations. 
In considering how law schools can use the VRIO framework, it is 
critical to first recognize that the process of creating a sustainable 
competitive advantage is largely based upon an individual organization 
navigating internal concerns while also adopting an external focus that 
uniquely addresses the perceptions and needs of prospective law students.  
This can be done directly—through communications to prospective students.  
This can also be done indirectly—through communications by graduates and 
the reputation in the profession. 
At the same time, merely because an individual organization seeks to 
communicate unique value to the market does not mean that the substantive 
quality of the education is diminished in any way.  In many instances, 
superior perceived value can be achieved by simply configuring traditional 
educational components in a new way or adding non-educational components 
to deliver unique value.  In the process, if superior value is actually delivered 
to the right individuals, the recruiting of superior students can increase too.  
Of course, once again, all of this must be achieved within the internal context 
of faculty as both a resource and a member of governance. 
For example, consider the common practice of offering combined 
J.D./M.B.A. degrees.  As compared to law schools that cannot offer 
combined degrees, there is an advantage.  However, many of the combined 
degree programs fail to make the most of the opportunity.  Rather than 
creating superior value—relative to other J.D./M.B.A. programs—the 
combined programs are really just overlapping, segmented, programs offered 
by separate schools.  The law school handles the law; the business school 
handles the business.  However, superior value could be delivered if the 
traditional J.D./M.B.A.s were creatively combined in a new way.  For 
instance, one way would be to require J.D./M.B.A.s to take some specialized 
versions of their capstone courses in a multidisciplinary format.  This could 
be linked to local economic resources to create a signature internship 
program that similarly exposes J.D./M.B.A.s to multidisciplinary problems 
often missed by any one discipline alone.  In this way, the program would be 
unique (for a while at least) and could be more successfully promoted to 
potential students with better credentials. 
In short, the overall purpose of the VRIO framework is to determine 
how, within existing and potential resources, a given firm can create unique 
value.  However, to do this, it is necessary that the value be created with a 
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focus on the market and ultimately delivered in a way that others will have 
difficult duplicating.  Accordingly, it is necessary to address each component 




A resource is considered valuable when “it enables an organization to 
increase revenues by taking advantage of opportunities in the organization’s 
environment, to reduce costs by neutralizing threats in the organization’s 
environment, or to do both.”110  The resource must “enable [the] firm to 
exploit environmental opportunities or neutralize environmental threats.”111  
In this regard, the focus of “valuable” is strictly limited to recognition of 
financial value to the organization.  The concept of public goods within the 
VRIO framework is only recognized to the extent that their creation increases 
the individual organization’s revenue, decrease costs, or both.  Although an 
individual law school can certainly justify creating public goods as part of its 
broader mission, it should not be confused with providing for the economic 
sustainability of the law school.  
As applied to U.S. law schools, an example of a valuable opportunity 
would be to develop a reputation for producing law graduates who are 
exceptionally prepared to practice something like “oil and gas law in 
multinational corporations.”  As a result, if the legal education of a particular 
law school can tailor their offerings to fully reach out to future oil and gas 
corporate lawyers, the offering would most certainly be perceived as valuable 
to a discrete segment of potential students.  Importantly, the value is in the 
result—not necessarily in the means by which the result is achieved.  In this 
regard, it is important to remember that “most people who attend law school 
expect to end up with a decent standard of living [among other things] that 
exceeds what they would have attained without the degree.”112  Therefore, 
considerably less value exists in simply offering a course on Oil and Gas 
Law—as opposed to producing law graduates who are exceptionally 
prepared to practice oil and gas law in multinational corporations. 
For these same reasons, a much more difficult question exists regarding 
the value of legal scholarship.  Whether or not scholarship (i.e. faculty 
research and writing) is valuable within the VRIO framework greatly 
depends upon the use to which the scholarship is put by the particular law 
school.  Is there a nexus between the scholarship and increased revenue for 
the school?  Does the scholarship—for the individual law school—“enable[] 
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[the individual law school] to increase revenues . . . to reduce costs . . . or to 
do both”?113  
Undoubtedly, some elite U.S. law schools could properly conclude that 
their scholarship is valuable under the VRIO framework.  The reputation for 
leading scholarship is likely to attract some students in applying to the 
particular school.114  It may also result in an increased receipt of some types 
of research grants.  Likewise, some other U.S. law schools that are known for 
niche specialties could also conclude that their niche-related scholarship is 
also valuable under the VRIO framework.  
However, other legal scholarship may present some challenging 
questions.  For instance, does the cost of producing the scholarship actually 
exceed the revenues that can reasonably be identified?  This could easily be 
determined by surveying current and past students about the criteria they 
used in originally selecting the particular law school.  For current purposes, 
let it suffice to state that scholarship provides a perfect example of how value 
within an institutionalized organization does not necessarily equate with 




The second component of the VRIO framework is whether or not the 
resource is rare.  Just because something is valuable does not necessarily 
mean that it is also rare.  “[I]f a particular resource or capability is controlled 
by numerous competing firms, then that resource is unlikely to be a source of 
competitive advantage for any one of them.”115  For instance, water is 
certainly valuable.  It has multiple uses and is necessary for life on earth.  
However, in most places on the globe, water is abundant.  Ordinarily, it is not 
rare—unless some additional unique aspects are perceived by consumers 
(making it rare again). 
For instance, in 1994 Pepsi “invested $3 million to purify municipal tap 
water in Wichita, Kansas—creating the Aquafina brand . . . by 2003, 
Aquafina brought in $8.1 billion for Pepsi.”116  In this case, the purification 
and adjustments to taste corresponded to market recognition of water quality 
concerns.117  Bottled water also addressed rising demands for convenience 
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and portability.118  The combination converted a generic commodity into a 
valuable brand. 
 For this reason, a firm resource is considered rare “when the number of 
organizations which possess, and/or are capable of possessing, the strategy 
are less than the number of organizations that is required for perfectly 
competitive conditions among a set of competitors or potential 
competitors.”119  In many ways, the concept of rarity is just another way 
asking if there is any unmet demand for the particular resource.  As such, 
rarity can be caused by various factors.   
As applied broadly to U.S. law schools, the historically poor adaptations 
by institutionalized competitors suggests that there should be multiple areas 
where innovative market-focused offerings could be considered rare.  For 
instance, take virtually any specific career where a law degree is considered 
to be beneficial.120  All that would be necessary for an individual law school 
to create a rare program would be to assemble—and communicate—a clearly 
targeted (but difficult to copy) program thoroughly serving that specific 
career.  Objectively, this should be far easier than trying to sell a twenty-
ounce bottle of water for two dollars! 
Note that simply creating a certificate or assembling courses does not, by 
itself, create rarity.  Unless backed by truly scarce faculty expertise and/or 
other difficult-to-copy characteristics (that are appreciated by the customer—
the students), certificates are easy to copy.  What is necessary is for the 
individual law school to communicate to the market how the offering is 
unique, and then take steps that make the offering more difficult to copy.  So, 
for instance, if the occupation is unique to the law school’s location (such as 
federal government and Washington, D.C.), the law school could include 
internships and active participation by professionals affiliated with the local 
resource.  Additional steps could be taken to make the experience even more 
distinctive by securing unique—and ideally exclusive—partnerships. 
Another way to look at rarity within the VRIO framework is to realize 
that, prior to the economic shock in 2008, all forms of legal education were 
perceived as being rare.  This essentially supported the institutionalization of 
legal education.  It was only after the shock that the rarity of a traditional 
form of legal education came into question for a sizable number of potential 
law school applicants.121  For the weaker schools, it is now questionable 
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whether there is any unmet demand for the particular traditional resource.122  
Consequently, prospective law students “are less inclined to maintain 
loyalties; they are seeking value from organizations, and are demanding that 
organizations provide a good reason for customers to deal with them.”123  
This has the unpleasant result of both reducing the demand for legal 
education as well as increasing the price sensitivity—unless individual law 
schools can successfully create their own rarity that is perceived and valued 
by students.  
Even if their resource is both valuable and rare, the fact remains that the 
individual organization may not necessarily be able to recognize any 
sustainable competitive advantage unless the resource is also difficult to 




A firm resource is imperfectly imitable when other organizations “are not 
able to imitate [them] . . . through duplication or substitution.”124  Generally 
speaking, barriers to imitation reduce to unique history, causal ambiguity, or 
social complexity.125  However, once again, the focus is on the perceptions of 
the customer rather than merely on the technical differences between the 
competitors. It is not enough to be different; the differences must be 
perceived and valued by potential customers—potential students.  In fact, it 
is even arguable that the customer perceptions may be more important than 
technical reality. 
For example, does anyone seriously think that there are major 
substantive differences between Coke and Pepsi?  Nonetheless, each of the 
brands has significantly different perceptions by the consuming public.  Each 
brand has achieved “imperfect imitability,” even though the underlying 
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offering is quite similar and generic brands often taste quite similar.  This is a 
lesson that many U.S. law schools have yet to learn. 
In applying inimitability to U.S. law schools, a number of patterns 
quickly emerge.  For instance, the inimitability of most leading law schools 
is at least partially the result of a unique history.126  History is difficult to 
imitate—even if the offerings of newer schools are technically superior.  Just 
as with Coke and Pepsi, history provides a unique patina to the brand of older 
law schools.  Moreover, the ability of lesser known law schools to “catch up” 
is made even harder where institutional pressures undermine competition 
between constituent organizations.  In these situations, the institutionalization 
of legal education reinforces the alignment—and ranking—of constituent 
schools.  In the process, institutionalization reinforces the status quo.  
As compared to imitability based on history, a slightly easier source of 
inimitability to overcome is “causal ambiguity.”127  This exists where the 
exact means of achieving a particular outcome is obscure.  For instance, if 
the recipe for a particular cookie is a trade secret, competitors will hopefully 
encounter difficulties replicating the cookie’s flavor.  The relationship 
between the inputs and outputs is unclear. 
As applied to law schools, causal ambiguity can relate to the means of 
achieving a particular distinction that is valued by potential law students.  For 
instance, if a particular law school consistently produces trial advocacy teams 
that win national competitions (and this is presumably both valuable and 
rare), then the ambiguity can be a source of inimitability.  The same situation 
could also be at work in the previous example of a reputation for producing 
great oil and gas attorneys.  There could be causal ambiguity in explaining 
the apparent preponderance and success of a law school’s graduates in a 
particular industry.128 
A last source of imperfect imitability is “socially complex” 
relationships.129  Examples of socially complex relationships include: “the 
interpersonal relations among managers in [an organization], [an 
organization’s] culture, [an organization’s] reputation among suppliers, and 
[an organization’s reputation among] customers [and consumers].”130  As 
with causal ambiguity, the contribution of social complexity is that it makes 
copying more difficult.   
For law schools, a socially complex basis for inimitability is simply 
developing a reputation for serving a particular niche exceptionally well.  
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Although the benefit of the end result (reputation in the niche) is hopefully 
obvious, the exact steps necessary to achieve it are hopefully quite obscure.  
Of course, in order to achieve inimitability, it is imperative that law schools 
do far more than just announce a certificate or a new course.  Other law 
schools will copy the innovation as soon as the certificate or course appears 
to be successful.  A similar problem exists with simply offering a combined 
J.D./M.B.A. program.  Any law school can partner with a business school to 
offer a similar program.  There must be more complexity that is more 
difficult for competitors to copy. 
For instance, if a law school offers J.D./M.B.A. joint degrees to students 
interested in entrepreneurship, the law school could consciously pursue 
social complexity and causal ambiguity while developing a long-term goal of 
developing a unique history.  This process could start by identifying the 
characteristics of good entrepreneur attorneys.  Developing those skills could 
then be integrated into the curriculum.  The law school could survey its own 
graduates to ask about their experiences and recommendations.  The law 
school could start a writing competition on entrepreneurial skills and the 
practice of law.  The law school’s law review could issue annual awards for 
best papers on law practice by sole practitioners.  The law school could offer 
CLE programs, open to current law students, on building a law practice.  The 
law school could even offer a cross-listed course on entrepreneurship—open 
to both law and business students.  On the faculty side, the law school could 
recruit faculty with experience and recognition in entrepreneurship law.  All 
of this would foster inimitability through social complexity.  Over time, the 
law school would develop a unique history-based inimitable reputation for 
producing exceptional “entrepreneurial lawyers.”  All of this would then 
need to be disseminated to potential students and employers.  
As a caveat, it is important to note that all of the efforts to create 
inimitability must be based upon both implementation and communication.  
It is not enough to do something outstanding if no one knows about it.  At the 
same time, it is also not enough to advertise a program, but not deliver the 
desirable performance.  It is only after the effort has been successfully 
implemented that the resulting reputation becomes difficult for other law 
schools to imitate.  As long as the law school continues to meaningfully 
support the reputation, the innovation will remain partially inimitable.  In 
contrast, if the law school fails to implement a quality plan and provide the 
necessary resources, the benefits will quickly evaporate. 
For all of the above reasons, one of the most critical components in the 
VRIO framework is the capability of the specific organization to successfully 
implement.  This leads directly to the last component of the VRIO 
framework—organization.  
 




Even if an opportunity is valuable, rare, and inimitable, it is still 
worthless if the organization is unable to execute.  In this regard, 
organization relates to the organizational capability to implement.  It refers to 
how “the organization’s formal reporting structures, management styles, 
explicit management control systems and compensation policies [are] 
designed to exploit the full competitive potential of its strategy. . . .”131  
Stated otherwise, the VRIO framework requires that the organization has the 
capability to effectively implement over time. 
In fact, the capability of an organization to execute is critical for an 
organization to recognize any of the benefits from the VRIO framework.  As 
it happens, this challenge is also integral to the previous discussions on 
behavioral economics and institutional theory.  Without the ability to 
execute, without the processes to make sure that strategies are implemented, 
there is no ability to achieve any sustainable competitive advantage.  It is 
specifically for this reason that the remaining portions of this Article focus 
on the processes connected with successful execution.  The next Section 
addresses the role of strategic planning in law schools (which assure 
alignment with both the external environment and the law school’s mission).  
The last Section then proposes a change-process model tailored for use by 
law schools.  Together, they are intended to increase the likelihood of 
specific law schools successfully deploying their capabilities to meaningfully 
adapt and execute.   
 
C. Law School Strategic Planning 
 
As noted previously, some law schools may reasonably believe that the 
existing approach to legal education is “fundamentally fine.”132  However, 
the pursuit of better market alignment does not necessarily conflict with the 
core mission and values of any specific law school.  A law school can 
actually both fulfill its existing mission and create a sustainable competitive 
advantage.  A law school can pursue its noble goals while implementing 
distinctive and meaningful programs consistent with the VRIO framework.  
To do this, all the law school needs to do is operate “strategically.”  
According to Igor Ansoff, “strategic” means “‘pertaining to the relation 
between the firm and its environment.’”133  By seeking to better align an 
organization with its external environment, strategy is critical to the long-
                                                          
131  Rowe & Barnes, supra note 106, at 285; see also BARNEY II, supra note 107, 
at 160–62 (italics omitted). 
132  Wu, supra note 79, at 417. 
133  IGOR ANSOFF, CORPORATE STRATEGY 5 (1965). 




term success of most organizations.134  Economically speaking, strategy 
enables organizations to deploy their resources in a way that profitably and 
uniquely creates customer value.  If properly implemented, strategic planning 
also assures that the potential innovations align with the individual law 
school’s mission and values.  Strategic planning can assure both the 
continued noble purpose of legal education as well as the benefits of 
meaningful change. 
In 1981, Kotler and Murphy135 specifically applied strategic planning 
principles to organizations in higher learning.  In this regard, Kotler and 
Murphy expressly recognized that in education the creation of unique value 
still begins with the identification of marketing opportunities.  Marketing 
opportunity for educational institutions was defined as “‘an attractive area of 
relevant action in which a particular organization is likely to enjoy superior 
competitive advantage[] . . . . An opportunity can be assessed in terms of two 
basic dimensions: (1) its potential attractiveness as measured by the amount 
of revenue or other results that an organization might value and (2) the 
probability that the institution will be successful in developing the 
opportunity.”136  
By providing for “other results that an organization might value,” Kotler 
and Murphy expressly provided for alternative value considerations beyond 
just revenue.  However, practically speaking, alternative value for 
organizations in higher education needs to be evaluated in addition to 
potential revenue—not instead of potential revenue.  Otherwise, the long-
term economic viability of the individual educational organization would be 
completely left to chance.  Accordingly, in evaluating different potential 
market opportunities (specifically looking for VRIO characteristics), Kotler 
and Murphy essentially suggest that schools start by conducting what is 
commonly known as a “SWOT” analysis.137  
A SWOT analysis is an effort to better understand the competitive 
landscape in which the organization exists, and then to determine where, 
                                                          
134  The reference to “most” organizations alludes to the fact that some 
organizations do not need to contend with any serious form of competition.  One 
situation where competition fails to exist is where a single organization enjoys 
economic monopoly power. 
135  Philip Kotler & Patrick E. Murphy, Strategic Planning for Higher Education, 
52 J. HIGHER EDUC. 470–89 (1981). 
136  Id. at 475 (emphasis in original). 
137  A “SWOT” analysis is a common approach used in business strategy to 
evaluate an organization’s competitive position by considering both the firm’s 
internal resources and its external market position.  “SWOT” refers to “Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats.”  For more details, see Barney I, supra note 
101, at 99.  
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within that context, the organization can best compete.138  This involves 
marrying a survey of the external market conditions used by the market-
based view, with the existing and potential firm capabilities used by the 
resource-based view.139  As a practical matter, this involves first considering 
all of the potential external market opportunities and threats.140  
For example, for law schools, potential opportunities would inherently 
include providing legal educational services to students interested in 
becoming licensed attorneys.  This could include students interested in 
practicing law within a particular state.  It also could include international 
students interested in becoming licensed in the United States, but practicing 
law in their home country (or practicing in the United States while serving 
entities from their home country).  This could then be broken down further 
by the various types of lawyer practices that already exist.  However, the 
analysis should not stop here.   
Opportunity-wise, the external market should also include students who 
want to receive a law license, but want to work in an industry or profession 
that does not require a law license.  An easy way to identify these industries 
or professions would be to survey recent graduates employed in fields where 
a J.D. is considered advantageous, but not required.  Surveying students 
pursuing combined degrees could also help to identify these fields: What are 
the students planning to do with their combined degrees?  What are the 
intended benefits of the degree?  Lastly, the external market should consider 
law students who ultimately secure jobs where a law degree is not deemed 
advantageous—as well as potential law students who have decided not to 
pursue a law degree: What are their goals?  How do these groups of 
individuals perceive the value of a legal education.  Would they consider a 
degree other than a J.D.?  How would they value it?  How large is the 
segment?  What would be necessary to better serve their needs? 
Once the external market has been surveyed, the next step is to determine 
the existing and potential threats that exist for each segment identified as a 
potential opportunity.  For instance, there would be numerous threats if the 
opportunity is as generic as “students interested in becoming licensed 
attorneys.”  Almost by definition, all law schools would be existing 
competitors.  For this reason, it is important to dig much deeper. 
For instance, what if there is a segment of insurance adjusters who value 
obtaining a J.D. but do not want to practice law?  It might prove beneficial to 
determine if there is any potential program certification that might be offered 
by the current providers of the Chartered Life Underwriter (CLU) Certificate, 
Chartered Property Casualty Underwriter (CPCU) Certificate, or Associate in 
Claims (AIC) Certificate.  If not, is there a possibility for an individual law 
                                                          
138  Id. 
139  See id. at 99; Porter, supra note 102. 
140  This corresponds to the “OT” in “SWOT.” 




school to partner with the certificate providers?  What other law schools 
already offer similar services?  Where are they located and where do their 
students originate?  The process of identifying actual and potential threats 
should be repeated for each opportunity.  Additionally, it should be 
determined if groups of opportunities naturally group together.  If so, threats 
should be examined for the groups as well. 
At the same time, the specific law school needs to evaluate its existing 
and potential resources “as providing a key to what it can accomplish.”141  
These resources can be either internal (in the form of faculty expertise) or 
external (in the form of alumni networks, unique geographic benefits or 
special industry access) in aligning with potential market demand.  A 
comparison of the potential opportunities and available organizational 
resources enables the educational organization to evaluate its own strengths 
and weaknesses.142  In particular, “[t]he school should pay attention primarily 
to those strengths in which it possesses a differential advantage [to other 
schools], that is, it can outperform competitors on that dimension.”143  When 
considered as a whole, the individual law school should have a much better 
idea of the attractiveness of the identified opportunities as well as the 
probability that the efforts would prove successful. 
“The theory is that an organization should pursue goals, opportunities, 
and strategies that are suggested by, or congruent with, its strengths and 
avoid those where its resources would be too weak.”144  However, at all 
times, options should be evaluated within the context of the external market 
opportunities and their alignment with the appropriate organizational 
distinctive competencies.  “Distinctive competencies are those resources and 
abilities in which the organization is especially strong.”145  
Once the school has completed its SWOT analysis, the next step is for 
the school to formulate (or reformulate) its organizational goals.  This starts 
by re-examining the organization’s mission.  The mission statement “defines 
what an organization is, why it exists, [and] its reason for being.”146  This is 
actually the heart of the problem.  In many ways, the mission statement 
                                                          
141  Kotler & Murphy, supra note 135, at 471. 
142  This corresponds to the “SW” in “SWOT.” 
143  Kotler & Murphy, supra note 135, at 477 (italics omitted).  Although it may 
not be initially obvious, virtually all organizations possess some sort of potential 
differential advantage.  For instance, pre-existing geographic proximity to the 
particular educational institution provides a compelling reason for some students to 
attend particular schools.  However other competitors may be similarly situated. 
144  Id. at 476. 
145  Id. at 476–77 (italics omitted). 
146  SMALL BUSINESS ENCYCLOPEDIA, Mission Statement, 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/encyclopedia/mission-statement 
[https://perma.cc/U6D7-HJ6K] (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). 
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overlaps with the process of institutionalization.  The greater the institutional 
pressures, the greater the likelihood that the individual organization will 
ignore meaningful consideration of its own mission statement.  After all, in 
institutionalized industries, the institution—rather than the individual 
organization—largely dictates what the organization is and why it exists.  
However, through the use of institutional entrepreneurship, the 
organizational focus can at least temporarily shift back to the organization’s 
mission statement. 
 Theoretically, the function of the mission statement is to communicate 
to internal stakeholders—like the faculty and staff—why the organization 
exists.147  By comparing the identified market opportunities, the initial 
SWOT analysis, and the mission statement, a law school has a clear process 
for either adjusting its existing mission to account for the new opportunities, 
or rejecting potential opportunities because they are outside the purposes for 
which the organization exists.  Either way, the nobility of the legal education 
is protected. 
 Of course, the process of formally reconsidering the mission statement 
provides an ideal opportunity to determine the extent to which faculty and 
staff have internalized the existing mission of the organization.  If the faculty 
or staff do not even know (or cannot agree upon) the contents of the school’s 
existing mission, it is critical to pause and thoroughly revisit the issue.  This 
could be the result of either institutionalization or bounded rationality by the 
faculty.  Clarifying these issues will provide faculty with the opportunity to 
consciously reconsider some of the organizational assumptions.  However, 
consensus on the organizational mission is essential.  Otherwise, even 
without any institutional pressures, it will be virtually impossible to 
consistently prioritize opportunities.148 
Next, having made sure to align the results of the SWOT analysis, and 
the revised mission statement, Kotler and Murphy clearly set forth the 
remaining steps of the strategic planning process.  First, a prioritized list of 
primary outcomes can be established.149  In other words, using the VRIO 
framework and other considerations, what opportunities will the organization 
pursue and which ones are most important?  How many opportunities have 
                                                          
147  May Chau, The Guide to Company Objectives and Key Results (OKR), 7 
GEESE BLOG (May 16, 2016), https://7geese.com/company-okrs/ 
[https://perma.cc/YYV6-SCDD]. 
148  Given the central role played by the mission statement, it is suggested one of 
the first steps of the strategic planning process is to determine how many of the 
organization’s faculty actually know what the mission actually states.  Once 
consensus is achieved as to the existing mission of the organization, the evaluation of 
potential opportunities should proceed much more smoothly. 
149  See Kotler & Murphy, supra note 135, at 479–80. 




been selected?  What are their relative priorities to each other?  What are the 
estimated probabilities of success? 
Second, individual goals need to be developed to explain how the 
objectives will be measured.150  This involves setting one or more goals for 
each objective.  What goals will be used to determine if the objective has 
been achieved?  For instance, if a law school is going to develop an oil and 
gas program, how many students need to be recruited in order for the 
program to be considered a success?  How high should the LSAT scores and 
grade point averages of the incoming students be for it to be considered a 
success?  How high should subsequent student employment rates be in order 
for the program to be considered a success?  How far out after graduation 
should the employment rates be measured? 
Third, once the goals have been preliminarily determined, one or more 
strategies must be selected in order to achieve each of the stated goals.151  For 
instance, how will the law school generally go about recruiting students to 
the new oil and gas program?  What generally needs to be in the program for 
the goals to be achieved?  Generally, where and how does the program need 
to be promoted?  What are the general approaches to link the program 
content to the students who will value it the most (and have the best 
credentials and/or employment capabilities)? 
Fourth, for each strategy or group of strategies, specific operational plans 
(tactics) should be developed to achieve the corresponding objectives.152  For 
instance, in developing the oil and gas certificate program, which oil and gas 
companies will be contacted to determine the ideal content of such a 
program?  How will the program be specifically promoted?  How much will 
each of the plans cost to implement?  Who will supply the resources? 
And lastly, the organization must provide a mechanism to continuously 
monitor the implementation in order to facilitate any necessary 
adjustments.153  In other words, who is responsible for monitoring progress 
and to whom do they report?  How frequently will progress be measured? 
Although the specific process of strategy development might at first 
appear complicated, the actual task remains quite simple: find ways for your 
organization to profitably deliver superior value to existing and potential 
students.   This can be achieved by: using one set of institutional 
entrepreneurs to engage and convene faculty; empowering another set of 
institutional entrepreneurs to use the VRIO framework to identify distinct 
and meaningful opportunities for distinctive and meaningful change; and 
then applying strategic planning principles to select, prioritize, and 
                                                          
150  See id. at 480–81.  
151  See id. at 481.  
152  See id. at 483–87.  Although Kotler and Murphy do not delve into tactics, the 
operational planning is a common component as included in this paper. 
153  See id. at 483–88. 
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implement opportunities that are consistent with both the external market and 
the mission of the individual law school.  By way of further clarification, in 
the last Section, all of these aspects are integrated into a single process model 
for individual law schools.   
 
V. A LAW SCHOOL CHANGE PROCESS MODEL 
 
By combining all of the topics discussed previously, institutional theory, 
behavioral economics, and management theory can be combined into a 
generic process model that significantly increases the likelihood of 
innovative success by individual law schools.  Although part of the proposed 
change process model is based upon Dorado’s 2005 article Institutional 
Entrepreneurship, Partaking and Convening,154 the proposed model does not 
track Dorado’s article exactly.  Most notably, Dorado’s article worked across 
three separate dimensions (resource mobilization, agency, and opportunity) 
to discuss “institutional change profiles.”155  For current purposes, the 
proposed model focuses only on resource mobilization (but incorporates 
some of the other considerations presented by the other dimensions as well).  
This dramatically reduces the scope and complexity of both the current 
Article and the proposed model.  To make the model simpler, the proposed 
model also relies upon components from an earlier version of Dorado’s 
article.156  
 
A. The Participants 
 
As proposed, the change process model involves the coordinated 
participation of five entities—each playing a specific role in facilitating 
appropriate and successful organizational change.  The five coordinated 
entities are: the Dean, the Entire Law Faculty, the Conveners Team, an 
Internal Leveraging Team (Innovators), and an External Leveraging Team 
(Catalysts). Each entity or team is discussed below.  The participants are then 
coordinated across seven stages—all with the intended goal of achieving 
successful organizational change.   
 
                                                          
154  See generally Dorado, supra note 85. 
155  Id. at 395. 
156  A description of Dorado’s earlier version was included in C.R. HININGS ET 
AL., DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONAL FIELDS, HANBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATION CHANGE AND INNOVATION, (Marshall Scott Poole & Andrew H. Van 
de Ven, Oxford University Press 2004). 




1. The Dean 
 
 The role of the Dean is to support and initiate (or reinitiate) the change 
process model.  In this regard, the Dean starts the process of constructing 
“chains of action” within the individual law school “with at least some pre-
fabricated links.”157  This means determining the paths and key personnel 
within the law faculty most likely to successfully champion meaningful 
change.  It also involves helping to identify any limitations on the entire 
process, and to frame the process in a way that addresses both bounded 
rationality as well as bounded willpower. 
Personnel-wise, the Dean needs to select one or two respected law 
faculty members with the ability of convincing the overall law faculty of the 
“desirability and viability of collaborating to jumpstart the development of a 
solution to a problem.”158  These respected faculty members need to be 
“politically skilled actors” who are instrumental in “bridging unaware, 
unsure or skeptical actors to explore the possibilities of cooperation.”159  
However, at the same time, the Dean should be careful not to predetermine or 
endorse any particular plans or ideas.  The focus is on simply starting to build 
links that channel “action through the shape and organization of those 
links,”160 rather than by predetermining the ends to which they are put. 
In regard to the overall proposed process, the Dean is the individual with 
the greatest knowledge of the limitations imposed on the law school by the 
University and other key institutions.  For this reason, by the time the process 
is initiated, the Dean should be able to clarify any University-related 
restrictions on potential innovations.  The Dean should determine and 
communicate any express institutional limitations on the change process as 
early as possible.   
2. The Entire Law Faculty 
 
In regard to the proposed change process, the law faculty is important for 
several reasons.  First, as previously noted, some law schools may rationally 
decide that meaningful change is unnecessary.  The sooner it is determined 
that this is the case, the sooner the process can shift to discussing other 
matters.  There is no need to pursue meaningful change if the faculty 
overwhelmingly sees no need for it. 
A second reason that the law faculty is important to the proposed change 
process is that institutional and behavioral forces are often internalized by the 
law faculty.  The greater the law faculty’s awareness of the challenges posed 
by institutionalization and behavioral economics, the less resistant the faculty 
                                                          
157  Swidler, supra note 81, at 277. 
158  Dorado, supra note 85, at 390–91. 
159  Id. at 391. 
160  Swidler, supra note 81, at 277. 
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will be to change.  In fact, by raising awareness of institutionalization and 
behavioral economics within the entire law faculty, individual faculty 
members will be more likely to meaningfully participate in the change 
process and support the empowerment of focused institutional 
entrepreneurship groups.  
A third reason that the law faculty is important is that they inherently 
represent the most valuable resource of any law school.  Without their 
engagement, contribution, and flexibility, the task of creating meaningful and 
distinctive programs becomes significantly more difficult—if not impossible.
  
3. The Conveners Team 
 
Besides the Dean and the entire law faculty, the key mechanism for 
successfully achieving change is the Conveners Team.161  The purpose of the 
Conveners Team is to convene the entire law faculty to specifically provide 
process, credibility, and legitimacy.162  At the same time, the Conveners 
Team will manage the groups charged with Leveraging, discussed below.  In 
this way, the Conveners Team will increase the chances that the Leveraging 
groups will identify opportunities that are acceptable to the entire faculty.  
Given the special importance of the Conveners Team, the recommended 
process model limits the role of the Dean to only picking one or two of the 
initial core members.  This recommendation assumes that the participation by 
the Dean will introduce a top-down bias or other resistance from the general 
faculty.  Since the goal of the process model is to obtain full participation 
from the general faculty, the preferable engagement is bottom-up, rather than 
top-down.  Of course, if the individual faculty has a collegial relationship 
with the specific Dean, this rule certainly can be relaxed as appropriate. 
 Assuming the Dean is not actively involved, the initially selected core 
members of the Conveners Team should then bootstrap the selection of the 
remaining members of the Conveners Team.  At all times, the Conveners 
Team should consist of the most respected, unbiased, senior members of the 
law faculty.  As their name implies, the Conveners Team serves as the 
convening linkage between the general law faculty and the innovative 
process represented by the other teams (discussed next).  In this regard, the 
Conveners Team should be sensitive to faculty questions regarding 
uncertainty of outcomes as well as structuring the process into manageable 
pieces.  Once this is achieved, the Conveners Team needs to forcefully 
resolve limitations to bounded willpower.  Faculty commitment to the 
process is critical. 
In assuring the ability of the Conveners Team to facilitate the success of 
the entire process, one or more members of the Conveners Team is expected 
                                                          
161  Dorado, supra note 85, at 401–02. 
162  Id. 




to monitor each of the other two teams.  Their involvement is not to manage 
the other teams but to facilitate focus, efficiency, and consensus throughout 
the entire process.  The Conveners Team is also expected to supplement the 
“pre-fabricated” linkages163 identified by the Dean that will enable the 
successful implementation of whatever changes are recommended.  This 
should consist of careful selection of all other team members who are 
appropriate for the respective tasks and committed to working in a collegial 
environment.  Where necessary, the Conveners Team will also need to 
identify any sources of general faculty resistance and take appropriate 
measures.  Ultimately, the job of the Conveners Team is to provide unbiased 
recommendations to the general faculty regarding the adoption of the 
proposed change strategies.  The Conveners Team should manage the entire 
change process through the point where specific opportunities are (hopefully) 
approved for implementation by the entire faculty. 
  
4. The Internal Leveraging Team (Innovators) 
 
Beside the Conveners Team, the next key component of the proposed 
change process is to assemble a highly entrepreneurial team from within the 
law school to identify, promote, and leverage specific opportunities.164  This 
team consists of the Innovators.  This team should consist of externally 
focused, market-aware, faculty and staff from admissions, placement, and 
alumni affairs.  Staff from each of these offices should have extensive 
knowledge about the students’ perceived value of existing offerings as well 
as knowledge of common complaints and potential additional offerings.  To 
the extent possible, creative law faculty with the ability to cooperatively 
work on multidisciplinary teams should be central to the team dynamics.  
The meaningful involvement (though not necessarily control) of faculty is 
necessary to increase the likelihood of adoption. 
The Innovator Team should be extremely creative, strategic, and 
encourage active endorsement of their recommended opportunities across the 
general faculty.165  The Innovator Team should be encouraged to freely share 
and refine their ideas.  In addition, they should be charged with primary 
responsibility for finding promising opportunities that challenge the 
assumptions of the organization.  
The Innovator Team must be comfortable applying the VRIO framework 
to potential opportunities for the individual law school.  In this way, the ideas 
promoted by the Innovators Team should be expected to lead to quantifiable 
increases in enrollment, and provide a basis for sustainable advantage 
relative to other law schools.  In order for the Innovators to be successful, 
                                                          
163  Swidler, supra note 81, at 277. 
164  See Dorado, supra note 85, at 385. 
165  Id. at 386. 
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they will need to do far more than just brainstorm.  Success will require 
research and formulation of strategies that will stop other law schools from 
simply copying new innovations.  Ultimately, the job of the Innovator Team 
is to creatively identify and promote substantive opportunities for the 
individual law school that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and organizationally 
appropriate.  
 
5. The External Leveraging Team (Catalysts) 
 
Sometimes, even motivated entrepreneurs are limited by their 
occupational or employment role.  Consequently, in addition to the (internal) 
Innovators Team, it is necessary to provide an additional external reality 
check by virtue of the External Leveraging Team—the Catalysts.  The 
Catalyst Team consists of external stakeholders with a commitment to 
quality legal education and the success of the individual law school.  At the 
same time, the Catalyst Team should consist of individuals with knowledge 
of potential resources beyond the law school.  As with the Innovators, the 
Catalyst Team should have a strategic perspective and be free to actively 
recruit support for ideas that they believe would be most beneficial for the 
law school.  However, their perspective is fundamentally from the outside-in.  
Except for input from a member from the Conveners Team, the Catalyst 
Team should completely consist of individuals who do not work for the law 
school or in education.  They should represent a broad array of creative 
individuals with external knowledge of potential law school opportunities for 
distinction. 
To some extent, the Catalyst Team can serve as a sounding board for the 
Innovator Team.  In the process, they can provide initial market feedback on 
the various Innovator ideas while contributing their own perspectives.  
Without the identification of quality opportunities, the benefit of the entire 
process will be minimized.  Ultimately, the primary value of the Catalyst 
Team is the provision of input from external stakeholders as to how to 
improve perceived market value, sustainability, and resources to support and 
prioritize the opportunities.  At the same time, the involvement of a 
Convening Team member within the Catalyst Team is meant to further 
shepherd the process along with the intention of producing solid 
recommendations back to the entire law faculty.  
 
B. The Stages of a Change Process Model 
 
Having described the specific role for each of the five key entities, this 
Section discusses the related seven-stage change process model.166  Within 
                                                          
166  By way of clarification, this model represents a synthesis by the author in 
assembling the earlier-identified considerations.  It represents the author’s own effort 
 




the model, each previously discussed entity plays either a primary or 
secondary role in achieving distinctive and meaningful change.  An overview 
of the model is provided immediately below with each stage discussed in 
greater detail. 
By way of overview, the seven-stage model assumes that the field of 
legal education has been institutionalized and is subject to the limitations of 
behavioral economics.  However, the model also assumes that the change 
being sought can be achieved within the currently existing ABA rules.  As 
such, there is no inherently obvious need for inter-organizational 
coordination. The proposed model seeks to empower and coordinate 
institutional entrepreneurs within individual law schools to convene and 
engage the entire law faculty in an endorsed change process.  
Once the entire faculty has endorsed the change process, the proposed 
change model utilizes both internal and external institutional entrepreneurs in 
leveraging new opportunities for distinctive and meaningful change.  
Consistent with the rest of this Article, the proposed model does not 
specifically endorse any particular plans.  Instead, the internal Innovator 
Team is charged with working cooperatively with the external Catalysts to 
identify unique opportunities.  Together, the two teams apply the VRIO 
framework to the available resources of their specific law school to make 
specifically tailored recommendations.  
The Conveners are next charged with helping to integrate the 
recommendations within an unbiased strategic planning process that involves 
the entire law faculty.  In this way, the Conveners will facilitate the entire 
faculty in specifically selecting some or all of the recommended 
opportunities for implementation.  “None” is not an option.  At the same 
time, the involvement of the entire faculty will assure that the recommended 
opportunities also align with the mission of the individual law school.  It is 
only after the entire faculty has endorsed specific change opportunities that 
the Dean will initiate implementation and monitoring of the plan in 
conjunction with Innovator team members.  Once the primary stages have 
been completed the Dean resets the entire process to refine, revisit, or 
otherwise pursue additional change for future cycles. 
By way of further clarification, it should be noted that the individual 
stages of the model may require significantly different amounts of time, 
effort, and preparation to complete at different law schools.  In some stages, 
such as those involving the entire law faculty, it is likely that multiple 
meetings and flexibility will be necessary to achieve optimal results.  In some 
instances, it will be necessary to modify the proposed model.  Depending 
upon specific circumstances, it may be necessary to more deeply engage 
                                                                                                                                         
to present a clearer process by which to apply the more abstract concepts discussed 
earlier and to achieve change within individual law schools. 
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university officials, the student body, employers of graduates, or bar 
associations.  Likewise, in Stage 2, a number of steps may either be 
completely unnecessary or require much greater depth (depending upon the 
perspectives and dynamics of the particular law school faculty).  Individual 
law schools should feel free to adapt the model as necessary to achieve the 
intended goal of the particular stage. 
 
 
1. Stage 1: Initiation 
 
In Stage 1, the law school Dean identifies the overall goals and 
limitations for the current efforts and clarifies its role within the broader 
strategic planning process.  For example, if this is not the first time that the 
law school has engaged the change process model, the Dean may wish to 
comment on the output from previous efforts.  The Dean may also wish to 
suggest changes to the current cycle to address specific issues previously 
encountered, or supply some basic information or other data to help in the 
success of the overall process.  However, in all instances, the Dean should 
provide a mechanism for determining the minimal success for each stage and 
the entire process.  For instance, if distinctive and meaningful change is 
being pursued, the Dean should indicate that, for example, “at least five 
viable ideas should be approved by this process for implementation.”  Zero 
should never be an option. 
Once the overall goals of the process are identified, the law school Dean 
should select one or more energetic and widely-respected faculty who are 
recognized by the general faculty for their balanced and unbiased character 
and commitment.  The selected faculty members should be fully informed of 
the entire change model and know exactly how the effort relates to the 
broader strategic planning process.  These leaders should be “quick to 
appreciate the beneficial impact of mutual exchange, proficient at scanning 
the environment surrounding the collaboration, and skilled in appraising the 




consequences of contemplated future actions.”167  These leaders also should 
be attuned to the resistance mechanisms typical of both institutional theory 
and behavioral economics.  
The core faculty initially selected by the Dean will then independently 
select the remaining members of the Conveners Team.  Unless circumstances 
dictate otherwise, the Dean should avoid any activities that would be viewed 
as interference in the selection of the remaining members.  Subsequent cycles 
of the change model can then simply maintain the composition of earlier 
team membership—with minimal adjustment as necessary. 
Ideally, all members of the Conveners Team should have existing 
relationships with the most creative members of the law school as well as 
existing relationships with faculty actively involved in strategic planning for 
the law school.  If the individual law school does not have an existing and 
meaningful strategic planning mechanism that integrates law faculty, one 
should be established.  Ideally, at least one member of the Conveners Team 
should also have established relationships with key external individuals who 
will ultimately constitute the Catalyst Team.  The primary role of the 
Conveners Team is to guide (but not manage) the developmental process of 
ideas across the seven stages while maintaining the integrity of the process 
for the general faculty.  Part of this challenge is to identify areas of resistance 
and proceed to address any concerns to the extent possible.  At all times, it is 
the responsibility of the Conveners Team to successfully guide the process to 
deliver the predetermined number of specifically adopted opportunities (as 
agreed upon by the entire faculty) for implementation and monitoring. 
 
2. Stage 2: Convening 
 
Having defined the general purpose, scope, and minimal deliverables, 
and facilitated the formation of the Conveners Team in Stage 1, next the 
Conveners Team is responsible for successfully convening the entire law 
faculty to engage and endorse the overall change process.  In this regard, 
recall that convening is based upon the creation of a collaborative initiative 
that “involves convincing [parties] of the desirability and viability of 
collaborating to jumpstart the development of a solution to a problem.”168  
Convening requires “politically skilled actors” who are instrumental in 
“bridging unaware, unsure or sceptical [sic] actors to explore the possibilities 
of cooperation.”169  This includes minimizing the potential role of bounded 
rationality, bounded willpower, and status quo bias throughout the process.  
This is why there is a Conveners Team. 
                                                          
167  Dorado, supra note 85, at 391. 
168  Dorado, supra note 85, at 390-91. 
169  Id.  
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In attempting to fully convene the faculty in the process, the exact 
configuration of Stage 2 will likely vary across different law schools.  The 
configuration of Stage 2 may require pursuing one or more of three different 
goals that depend upon the character, composition, and perspectives of the 
law faculty at the specific school.  It is up to the Conveners Team to 
determine the optimal configuration for their specific school—with the goal 
always being to successfully achieve meaningful change. 
For instance, some of the law faculty might be unaware of the taken-for-
granted assumptions that accompany institutionalization.  This could cause 
some of the law faculty to be less flexible in accepting innovative ideas.  At 
the same time, other law faculty might believe that individually meaningful 
change is completely unnecessary.  Yet other law faculty might simply desire 
a greater understanding of the process of institutional entrepreneurship and 
change.  However, in all instances, the Conveners need to engage the 
individual law faculty in ways most likely to influence them to endorse the 
overall change process and commit to accepting at least some of the resulting 
recommendations.   
Assuming an individual law school deems it necessary to cover all of the 
above-listed concerns, the specific goals for Stage 2 would be as follows:  
 
 First, to sensitize the law faculty regarding the impact of 
institutionalization and behavioral considerations to their own 
perspectives and decision-making;  
 Second, to determine the receptiveness of the law faculty of pursuing 
meaningful and distinctive change by either increasing revenue or 
reducing costs; and 
 Third, to engage law faculty by explaining the model and obtaining 
their endorsement of the overall change process.  
 
At all times, it is recommended that Conveners pursue their respective goals 
in bite-sized pieces.  This will reduce resistance due to bounded rationality.  
The Conveners should feel free to adjust the number, duration, and 
configuration of dedicated faculty meetings as necessary to maximize the 
chances for success.   
In pursuing the first of these goals (sensitivity to impact of 
institutionalization and behavioral considerations), Conveners may wish to 
begin by engaging the law faculty with questions that highlight some of their 
own taken-for-granted assumptions170 in legal education.  The goal of these 
questions is not necessarily to resolve any issue, but to cause faculty to pause 
and individually challenge some of their own assumptions, and appreciate 
how it impacts their own decision-making.  In the process, these questions 
                                                          
170  Scott II, supra note 38, at 496. 




(or questions like them) might highlight how taken-for-granted assumptions 
can overshadow the ability of the law school to recognize innovative 
opportunities.   
Conveners could use various methods to assure active individual 
participation.  For instance, faculty could be asked to discuss their individual 
answers to some or all of the questions below: 
1. What are the outer limits of what constitutes the practice of law?  
Why? 
2. How have these changes been incorporated into U.S. legal 
education?   
3. What have been the biggest changes in the practice of law over the 
last century?   
4. What has NOT been incorporated into U.S. legal education?  Why?   
5. When it comes to legal education, who is the customer?   
6. What is the broadest possible list of benefits that a law student 
obtains by obtaining a legal education?   
7. How does your individual school support each of these benefits?   
8. What benefits does your school NOT support and why?   
9. What complaints have you heard from students and recent graduates 
about the existing educational offerings at your specific law school?   
10. Are there any other groups of potential customers that could benefit 
from what a legal education has to offer?  Who?   
11. Why has your law school NOT pursued extending benefits to these 
additional potential customers?   
12. What is the mission of your law school?  How well do you think you 
achieve this mission?   
13. What could your school do better to fulfill its mission?   
14. What is unique about the legal education provided at your individual 
law school?   
15. What could be unique, but is not currently, about the legal education 
provided at your individual law school and why isn’t it being done?   
16. What is the difference between the legal education provided by your 
individual law school and your biggest competitor?   
17. Who is your biggest competitor?  Why do you consider them to be 
your biggest competitor?   
18. Why do so many potential law students rely upon the U.S. News and 
World Report ranking of U.S. law schools?   
19. Why do individual law students attend your law school?   
20. Is there anything that could be done to increase the value of the legal 
education offered by your law school?  What?   
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By asking questions like those presented above, law faculty should become 
more conscious of the impacts of institutionalization in creating taken-for-
granted assumptions.171  It should also naturally raise the prospect of faculty 
engagement in meaningful change.  In the process, the general faculty should 
become more aware and receptive to a broader array of the opportunities that 
they will be asked to approve in Stage 6.   
Of course, there are other concerns that the Conveners may need to 
address besides simply the awareness of institutionalization and limits of 
behavioral economics.  The second potential goal of Stage 2 is to determine 
the extent to which individual law school faculty perceive of any need for 
change.  As such, the Conveners Team may wish to have the faculty answer 
or discuss an additional series of preliminary core questions.  One question 
that the Conveners Team might wish to ask the law faculty might be: “Do 
you (as a law faculty member) believe that your law school should pursue, as 
a priority, either new sources of revenue or ways to reduce costs?  Pick one: 
YES or NO.” 
If a significant number of law faculty respond “no”—ask why.  It may be 
that your law school is fortunate enough not to need to change—or your 
faculty may suffer from either bounded rationality or bounded willpower.  It 
is important to clarify the situation.   
The Conveners Team should listen closely.  Before deciding how to 
proceed, the Conveners Team should fully understand the perspectives of the 
law faculty that believe change is unnecessary.  The law faculty may know 
something you do not; or the faculty may need to know something more.  
Educate them if necessary.  Given the importance of consensus building in 
law school governance, it is important to have an open, sincere understanding 
before deciding what to do next.  In some contexts, the option to do nothing 
might well be a legitimate alternative.  The sooner the Conveners determine 
this, the better. 
However, assuming that a clear majority of law faculty agrees that doing 
nothing is not an option, the next step is to solicit faculty feedback in 
selecting the general priorities for change options.  The Conveners Team 
might therefore ask the law faculty a second question: “Should the primary 
focus of organizational change be either cost-cutting or revenue growing?  
Pick one: cost-cutting or revenue growth.”   
At its most fundamental level, responding to an environmental shock 
requires organizations to decide how to cope in ways that improves their 
chances for survival.  One way to do this is to determine how to increase 
organizational value.  It therefore helps to know if the faculty primarily 
believes that their law school should cope by pursuing either Option 1—
reducing costs, or Option 2—increasing revenue. Notably, there is no Option 
                                                          
171  Id. at 496. 




3—do both (or neither).  Once again, organizational focus requires clarity of 
purpose and the pursuit of meaningful change has to start with commitment.  
Moreover, it is assumed that all U.S. law schools are already trying to both 
reduce costs and increase revenue.  It is necessary for the faculty to clarify 
what they believe should be the primary focus of significant change.  Each 
distinctive priority presents its own advantages and disadvantages.  The 
answers to these second questions should confirm the receptiveness of the 
law faculty to pursuing meaningful and distinctive change by either 
increasing revenue or reducing costs.  The scope of the process can therefore 
be adjusted accordingly.   
 With these issues resolved, the third and primary goal in Stage 2 is to 
obtain faculty endorsement of the overall change process.  For some law 
faculty, all that may be necessary is to have them read a copy of this Article 
and have them affirmatively vote to follow its process model.  For other law 
faculty, they may want to know a little more about the process for instituting 
meaningful changes.  Remember that individual uncertainty is a potential 
source of status quo bias.  It should be addressed accordingly.  For faculty 
who want to know even more about the underlying theory, these faculty 
members should be encouraged to learn about the linked processes of 
theorization, legitimization, and dissemination.   
The first step—theorization—“involves both building a model of how 
new practices and organizational forms work, and providing a justification 
for them in the current and future contexts.”172  Through theorization, the 
generalizability of the initial, narrow experiences of new alternatives is 
subject to more rigorous investigation.173  The theorization informs the wider 
population (in our case, the law faculty) about what, exactly, is the new 
process and related alternatives.  Theorization also provides the foundation 
for comparison of the new alternatives to the old alternatives.  In the process, 
theorization enables justification of the new alternatives to the entire group of 
socially connected individuals.174  Theorization thereby provides the rational 
foundation for understanding the change model.  In turn, it also facilitates 
legitimization.175  Coincidentally, theorization also helps to address 
decisional problems resulting from the cognitive limitations of bounded 
rationality.   
The second step is legitimization.  Legitimacy is defined as “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
                                                          
172  C.R. HININGS ET AL., supra note 156, at 312.  
173  Id. at 314. 
174  Id. at 310. 
175  One of the potential uses for the present article is to provide the theoretical 
basis—theorization—of the practical recommendations of the next Section. 
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norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”176  Legitimation is “the process of 
linking new ideas, forms and practices to sets of values and logics that are 
held in esteem by field actors and by the surrounding societal context.”177  
Thus, subjecting new ideas or practices to theoretical development has the 
additional benefit of enabling the new alternatives to be adopted and held in 
greater regard by peers.  In this way, innovations by “fringe” individuals or 
entities are able to be tested and embraced by others.  In the process, the new 
alternatives obtain greater “moral legitimacy” both within and beyond the 
group—in this case, within the law faculty.178   
In the present model, the use of internal Innovators and external 
Catalysts teams to use leveraging for recommended opportunities is the 
conscious creation of “fringe” entities that have been sanctioned, in advance, 
by the individual faculty.  In this way, the entire faculty involvement in 
reviewing and selecting opportunities as part of the subsequent strategic 
planning process is consciously intended to provide a legitimization 
mechanism for meaningful change.  The entire faculty will be invited to 
examine the output and decide which opportunities align with the law 
school’s mission and are a source of sustainable competitive advantage. 
Once the process and proposed alternatives have been subjected to 
theorization and legitimation, the last step in integration is by way of 
dissemination.  Dissemination includes the speed, frequency, and patterns of 
diffusion of the new alternative.179  This can be achieved through the iterative 
application and review of outcomes from earlier efforts.  In the present 
model, the Conveners achieve this directly by holding one or more meetings 
with faculty where the entire faculty is invited to discuss any concerns and 
ultimately to select the opportunities that they approve.  Moreover, with each 
cycle of the proposed change process model, the faculty will be able to 
reevaluate the cumulative value, context, and subsequent performance of 
earlier decisions.  Legitimation will increase with each cycle.   
In sum then, there are several possible issues that the Conveners may 
need to address as part of Stage 2.  The Conveners should use their discretion 
in determining the need and configuration of any efforts to address the 
related goals.  However, under all instances, it is critical that the Conveners 
Teams get an unambiguous commitment from the general law faculty that 
they will accept, support, and implement at least some amount of the output 
of the change process model.  The acceptable number can be selected by the 
Dean in advance or left to future determination as some number greater than 
zero.  However, do not proceed to Stage 3 unless and until there is full 
                                                          
176  Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional 
Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995). 
177  C.R. HININGS ET AL., supra note 156, at 312. 
178  Id. at 310 (citing Schuman, supra note 176). 
179  Id. at 311. 




faculty endorsement of the change process model endorsed by the Conveners 
Team.  
  
3. Stage 3: Identify & Refine Opportunities for Leveraging 
 
Having obtained overall faculty engagement and endorsement for the 
change process model, in Stage 3 the Conveners Team proceeds to recruit 
members of both the Innovator Team and the Catalyst Team.  The purpose of 
both teams is to identify optimal opportunities that comply with the VRIO 
framework.  The job of both teams is to creatively identify distinctive and 
meaningful opportunities where the individual law school can create a 
sustainable competitive advantage.  While the Innovators and Catalysts are 
doing this, the role of the Conveners Team is to establish a timeline for 
completion of this stage, determine the form of the specific deliverables, and 
continue to engage the general faculty.   
 In order to increase the likely value of the deliverables, members of the 
Innovator Team should consist of the most creative, outward looking faculty 
and staff.  By design, the Innovator Team should consist of individuals 
internal to the law school who are especially committed to finding and 
pursuing better opportunities.  These should be the individuals from within 
the law school most capable of improving the fit of the law school with the 
external market and correcting problems with the implementation of existing 
programs.   
Once the Innovator Team has been recruited, they should be immediately 
turned loose.  Let the Innovators Team establish their own approach to 
leadership and management.  Of course, some predetermined target number 
of opportunities should be provided to the Team.  This should help the 
Innovator Team to avoid being overwhelmed.  Any additional ideas 
identified by the Innovators Team can be saved and then used in future 
initiatives.   
The Innovator Team should be encouraged to talk with existing students 
and recent graduates.  It should also be encouraged to talk with current and 
potential employers of recent graduates.  The goal is to creatively formulate 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and organizationally appropriate offerings that can 
be adopted and implemented by the individual law school.  At all times, the 
Innovator Team should remain cognizant of identifying opportunities that 
have a reasonable probability of providing a sustainable competitive 
advantage.  The Innovator Team should be given a clear budget for doing 
market research and evaluating viable strategies to recruit more (or better) 
students.  The Innovator Team should also be permitted to group 
opportunities based upon potential complementary benefits.  At the same 
time, the Innovator Team should estimate the probability of success in 
pursuing each opportunity.  The Innovator Team should determine the 
amount and type of resources that would be necessary to make the selected 
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strategies a successful reality.  All of this should help the Innovator team 
ultimately decide which opportunities to recommend, endorse, and promote. 
While the Innovators Team proceeds to start pursuing opportunities, the 
Conveners Team should begin to organize externally engaged parties to 
constitute the “Catalyst Team.”  In this regard, the Dean, alumni affairs, 
fundraising, and members of the Innovator Team may be able to recommend 
Catalyst Team members.  However, the decision as to composition and size 
of the Catalyst Team should ultimately rest with the Conveners Team.   
During Stage 3, the purpose of the Catalyst Team is to provide a fresh 
external perspective regarding ideas originated by the Innovator Team.  
Therefore, although the Catalyst Team can start to formulate their own ideas 
for how to improve curricular offerings, the Catalyst Team is intended to 
supplement the efforts of the Innovators.  However, it is important that the 
Catalyst Team remains involved as a perpetual external reality check on the 
process.  It is up to the Conveners Team to assure that optimal balance is 
maintained between the Innovator and Catalyst Teams.   
Together, the Innovator and Catalyst Teams can evaluate the combined 
upside benefits of all of the ideas.  However, it is assumed that the Innovator 
Team will have more time available to pursue its goals.  Whenever meetings 
are possible between the Innovators Team and the Catalyst Team, one of the 
primary goals will be to compare their own thoughts about both the 
opportunities and threats to those opportunities.  The primary deliverable(s) 
resulting from the combined discussions, besides a list of potential projects, 
should be the foundation for strategic planning and a SWOT analysis in 
Stage 4.   
In this regard, given their day-to-day experiences, it may be tempting for 
some Innovator and Catalyst Teams to view the entire process as an 
impossible task.  Fortunately, nothing could be further from the truth.  
Although institutionalization and bounded rationality may have led to 
perceptual blindness to opportunities, the opportunities still exist in 
abundance.  All that is necessary is for a particular law school to seriously 
look for them, and then formulate and implement strategies creating VRIO 
resources.   
By way of initial generic guidance, consider the data listed below.  All of 
this suggests some level of unmet potential demand for legal education in 
niche markets of various sizes.  Additional detail is available by visiting the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS):  
 
1. Of the 792,500 U.S. lawyers in 2016, 161,700 of them worked as 
self-employed lawyers.180  By 2026, the number of self-employed 
                                                          
180  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/lawyers.htm#tab-6 [https://perma.cc/9FV3-CDUP] 
 




lawyers is expected to increase slightly (7.4%) to 173,800.181  This 
suggests that one area where law schools can look to add value is by 
developing a sustainable strategy for producing law school graduates 
that are successful as self-employed lawyers.  The challenge will be 
in configuring resources to comply with the VRIO framework. 
2. Of the 792,500 U.S. lawyers in 2016, only 382,100 (48%) of them 
were engaged in the direct provision of legal services for hire.182  
This means that 52% of all lawyers in 2016 (about 410,000) were not 
engaged in the provision of legal services for hire.  By 2026, the 
numbers of employed lawyers not providing “Legal Services for 
hire” will increase slightly (7.7%) to 411,600.183  Notably, within this 
context, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has stated that “a law school 
graduate’s willingness to relocate and his or her practical experiences 
are becoming more important.”184 This strongly suggests that another 
area where law schools can look to add value is through the 
development of a sustainable strategy for producing law graduates 
prepared for geographic mobility, developing practical experiences, 
and prepared to practice of law OUTSIDE the provision of legal 
services for hire.  Once again, the challenge will be in configuring 
the individual law school’s resources to comply with the VRIO 
framework. 
3. Looking more specifically at the 410,000 U.S. lawyers who do 
directly provide legal services for hire, there are multiple areas where 
law schools can add value by tailoring educational offerings to 
address emerging issues.  For instance, how about developing a law 
program specifically tailored to the needs of international business?  
Look beyond the local practice of law to incorporate the global 
context.  Once again, the challenge will be in configuring the 
individual law school’s resource to comply with the VRIO 
framework. 
4. Alternatively, extrapolating from the most recent 2016 ABA 
employment data for recent graduates, indicates that, in reference to 
                                                                                                                                         
(last visited Jan. 15, 2018) [hereinafter BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS]  (compare 
Code TE1000 to TE1100, [cells D6 and D7, respectively]). 
181  Id. (comparing Code TE1100, 2016 [Cell D7] with 2026 [Cell G7]). 
182  Id. (comparing Code TE1100 [Cell D6] to Code 54110 [Cell D129]). 
183  Id. (comparing Code 54110, 2016 [Cell D129] with 2026 [Cell G129]).  Note, 
however, that the increase in total law enrollment (comparing Code TE1100 [Cell 
D7] with 2026 [Cell G7]) will slightly outstrip the increases in employment in the 
direct provision of legal services for hire. 
184  See id. 
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those employed as lawyers, there is an additional 21.93%185 of recent 
law graduates employed in jobs which do not technically require bar 
passage, but still consider a J.D. to be an advantage in employment.  
Applying the 21.93% to the BLS data supports results in an 
estimated  170,000 additional law graduates employed in non-law 
positions where they are still directly benefitting from a law 
license.186  To address this, law schools could add value by 
developing a sustainable strategy for producing law graduates 
successful outside the traditional practice of law.  Once again, the 
challenge will be in configuring the individual law school’s 
resources to comply with the VRIO framework.   
5. Similarly, recruit potential law students who are interested in using 
their law degree in conjunction with other advanced degrees.  
Extending the earlier example about producing exceptional oil and 
gas attorneys, how about a J.D./ M.B.A. program that specifically 
integrates the estimation of monetary value of individual oil and gas 
wells?  How about a J.D. combined with a MSc. in Petroleum 
Engineering?  Or how about a J.D. combined with an M.S. in 
Computer Science?  Whatever the decision, make sure to recruit, and 
then deliver graduates that create value to their employers.  This 
strategy could be replicated across multiple potential industries with 
multiple degrees.   
6. Even ignoring all of the items in 1 through 5, the projections from 
the BLS suggest that there are multiple niche categories for the 
employment of lawyers within traditional practice areas.  All that 
individual law schools need to do is build a unique reputation for a 
superior education—delivering superior lawyers. Look at the BLS 
data.187  It breaks out attorney employment—including future 
projections—into categories like Legal Services, Government, 
Finance and Insurance, Management of Companies and Enterprises, 
Waste Management and Remediation, Information, Manufacturing, 
                                                          
185  According to the 2016 ABA Recent Graduate Employment Data, the total 
number of recent graduates who reported being in jobs requiring bar passage was 
23,948.  At the same time, the total number of recent graduates who reported being 
in jobs where bar passage was not required but was still an advantage was 5,254. 
5,254/23,948 = .2193.  If this percentage is multiplied by 778,700 (the estimated 
employment for all lawyers by the BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 180, 
the estimate is 170,168.  
186  Note, the BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS data, supra note 180, only includes 
data on lawyers working as attorneys.  See, tab, “What Lawyers Do.”  This does not 
include work in a capacity other than as a lawyer where the law degree is 
unnecessary but still an advantage. 
187  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 180. 




Educational Services, Healthcare and Social Assistance, Wholesale 
Trade, Real Estate and Rental/Leasing, Mining, Quarrying, Oil & 
Gas Extraction, Publishing (except Internet), and 
Computer/Electronic Mfg.188  Pick one, or drill down further and 
identify an even clearer niche—then add unique value.  Once the 
optimal niche is identified, the individual law school simply needs to 
configure their resources to comply with the VRIO framework.   
7. Putting all of the other items aside, the creation of a sustainable 
competitive really is not all that difficult.  In fact, every time there is 
any problem in the delivery or content of legal services or legal 
standards, there is an opportunity for someone in legal education.  
All the problems might not be sexy, but the opportunity is real if a 
solution can be provided within the VRIO framework.  Additionally, 
always remember that the customer’s (potential student’s) perception 
of value is what matters.  Recall the example of Coke versus 
Pepsi.189  Try walking down the soft drink isle of your local grocery 
store and ask yourself—what do they know that law schools do not?  
Better yet, pick up a bottle of Aquafina and ask yourself what is so 
special about it?   
  
In looking at the information above, there are numerous potential 
opportunities for individual U.S. law schools to develop their own niche 
VRIO offerings that provide unique value.  In Stage 3, the challenge for the 
Innovator and Catalyst Teams is to identify and determine which 
opportunities most closely align with the individual law schools current and 
potential capabilities.    
 
4. Stage 4: Obtaining Team Agreement On Prioritization and 
Recommendations 
 
 In Stage 4, members from all three teams and the Dean meet to 
hopefully agree on a prioritized list of recommended opportunities and 
corresponding resource estimates.  During this meeting, members of the 
Innovators and Catalyst Teams are free to advocate for particular 
opportunities.  Each is welcome to champion one or more options for 
distinctive change at the individual law school.  Each is also welcome to 
explain related steps that should be taken to stop other schools from copying 
the innovation.  However, ultimately, the purpose of Stage 4 is to facilitate a 
consensus across the active participants as to an agreed-upon list of 
opportunities to recommend for adoption by the entire faculty.   
                                                          
188  Id. 
189  See supra Part IV.B. 
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For this reason, a secondary purpose of Stage 4 is an administrative fail-
safe to resolve any concerns between active participants before formal 
recommendations are presented to the entire faculty.  Stage 4 also provides 
the Conveners Team and the Dean with the opportunity to limit the number 
of recommended opportunities to some smaller number so as to ensure a 
unanimous (or at least wide-spread) support for whatever is recommended.  
The risk is that nominal disagreements on marginal opportunities will distract 
the full faculty vote.  Discarded opportunities can always be revisited during 
future cycles.  In this way, Stage 4 provides the Conveners Team with the 
opportunity to engage the Dean and other teams in a consensus-building 
meeting.  Again, the goal is to assure wide-spread (if not unanimous) support 
across all team members prior to formally making any recommendations to 
the entire faculty.   
  
5. Stage 5: Update and Integrate Strategy in Light of Prioritized 
Opportunities 
 
After having obtained a consensus across the teams and the Dean on a 
prioritized recommended list of opportunities, in Stage 5, the Conveners “re-
convene” the entire faculty or whatever group is in charge of strategic 
planning for the law school.  The purpose of Stage 5 is to assure that the 
recommended opportunities align with the existing mission of the law school 
but are also formally adopted in the form of a prioritized list of opportunities 
that can be immediately pursued.   
Given the strategic planning process previously explained in Part IV.C., 
it should be expected that Stage 5 will include the conscious consideration of 
how the recommended opportunities align with the law school’s available 
resources and the external environment.  The strategic planning process 
should include consideration of how the recommended opportunities create 
unique value.  Accordingly, in evaluating different potential market 
opportunities (specifically looking for VRIO characteristics), the law school 
should start by conducting a SWOT analysis (if one has not already been 
conducted by the Innovator or Catalyst Teams).  At the same time, the law 
school should evaluate its existing and potential resources “as providing a 
key to what it can accomplish.”190  In particular, “[t]he school should pay 
attention primarily to those strengths in which it possesses a differential 
advantage [to other schools], that is, it can outperform competitors on that 
dimension.”191   
Once the evaluations required of Stage 5 have been completed, the 
adjusted list should then be formally adopted—either in whole or in part (as 
appropriate)—by either the entire faculty or whatever appropriate entity 
                                                          
190  Kotler & Murphy, supra note 135, at 471. 
191  Id. (italics omitted).  




provides such formal acceptance in the given law school.  Ideally, the 
consideration and selection should be done as part of an open discussion that 
includes all parties, including the external Catalyst Team members.  Once 
formally accepted, the next step (either within Stage 5 or 6—depending upon 
the law school’s existing procedures) is to develop the individual strategies 
explaining how each of the opportunities will be achieved.  This can 
incorporate recommendations that were previously made about how the 
opportunities can best be achieved in practice.  This should also include one 
or more means of measuring the extent to which the individual strategies 
have been successful.  Moreover, for each objective, specific operational 
plans (tactics) should be developed to achieve the corresponding objectives. 
 
6. Stage 6: Implement and Monitor 
 
Given that all steps should have been completed to identify, prioritize, 
align, and authorize the pursuit of specific opportunities, Stage 6 involves the 
implementation and monitoring of performance.  In this regard, all parties 
should remain cognizant that the recognition of a sustainable competitive 
advantage requires both successful implementation and communication to 
the market.  Moreover, given the continuing need for faculty involvement, it 
would be a huge mistake at this point to simply throw the opportunities over 
the wall for someone else to handle.  For this reason, it is important for the 
Conveners Team and/or Dean to provide systematic updates to the faculty on 
the progress of any selected opportunities.  Similarly, it would be beneficial 
to recruit participants from all earlier stages of the model to observe the 
implementation and make recommendations for improvements.   
Overall, it is assumed that the Dean will have primary responsibility for 
managing the implementation process.  However, at the very least, it is 
recommended that Innovators also participate in the progress of monitoring 
the performance of each individual plan.  Given the central role of the 
Innovators in identifying and prioritizing the opportunities, the Innovators 
should be ideally suited to make sure that the implementation is done in a 
way that is most likely to achieve the intended purposes.  Innovators should 
therefore recommend incremental adjustments that could enhance overall 
performance.  For this reason, it is recommended that Stage 6 continue (with 
broad participation, monitoring, and reporting) until such time as the 
individual success or failure for each opportunity has been determined.   
  
7. Stage 7: System Reset and Repeat 
 
Having completed all of the primary portions of the change process 
model, the purpose of Stage 7 is to reset the process by integrating the 
lessons learned for future use.  To do this, the Dean and the Conveners Team 
should debrief all team members and the general faculty regarding their 
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experiences with the process.  Special care should be taken to reinforce the 
commitment to the process (overcome bounded willpower) and answer any 
questions that may have arisen.  In this same regard, the Conveners should 
remain cognizant of potential problems presented by individual outcome 
uncertainty.  This can be easily addressed by simply inviting individual 
faculty participation and involvement.  It can be further addressed by noting 
which faculty members might face particularly dramatic role changes by 
virtue of the recommended opportunities, and allaying their concerns and 
asking for their feedback.  This feedback process can improve the model (or 
the model’s performance) for its next iteration.  Additionally, this process 
can include scheduling the next iteration of the change process model, 
adjusting the membership of the various teams, and potentially agreeing on 




According to both behavioral economics and institutional theory, the 
current problems in legal education are not simply caused by the stubborn 
resistance to change.  According to behavioral economics and psychology, 
the problems for U.S. law schools started as soon as the decisional 
considerations exceeded the cognitive limits and willpower of individual law 
faculties.  Eventually, further change was also hampered by the emergence of 
a status quo bias.   
Pursuant to institutional theory within sociology, the problems with 
organizational decision-making probably began as soon as U.S. law schools 
began to coalesce into an institutional field.  Although the resulting 
institutional pressures assured stability across the field, the pressures also 
created barriers to meaningful organizational adaptation.  These impediments 
meant that, while U.S. law schools remained stable, the broader society and 
the practice of law continued to change.  Alignment was lost.     
Now, U.S. law schools face the potential consequences of an exogenous 
shock to legal education.  Both the number and quality of law school 
applicants have collapsed.  With the devastating economic impact on law 
school budgets, law schools now have to make a choice.  Do they want to 
seek meaningful adaptation?  Given differences in resources and market 
positions across U.S. law schools, the individual decisions may vary.  
However, one way or another, the carrying capacity of the field will reach a 
new equilibrium.  The supply and demand curve will reach a new equilibrium 
too.  The question is how many schools will successfully and uniquely adapt 
versus how many will decide to merge or simply disappear.   
For law schools seeking to adapt, institutional entrepreneurship offers 
several promising mechanisms to navigate the limitations identified by both 
behavioral economics and institutional theory.  Through institutional 
entrepreneurship there is a vehicle for temporarily overriding decisional 




constraints by convening the general faculty and leveraging especially 
promising opportunities.  Moreover, facilitating change within the VRIO 
framework enables the selection and deployment of specific opportunities 
that can provide sustainable competitive advantages.   
The proposed seven-stage process change model provides a preliminary 
effort to put it all together.  However, ultimately, the success of these efforts 
will be evidenced by the extent to which individual law schools successfully 
achieve an improved, unique, and sustainable alignment of their resources 
with the external needs of their law students, the legal profession, and society 
at large.  Looking at the external data, it is clear that meaningful 
opportunities remain. Success is potentially available to virtually all U.S. law 
schools—but only if they choose to meaningfully implement and adapt.  To 
the extent that multiple law schools become meaningfully engaged in this 
process, the future is truly promising.   
Let’s get started.   
 
